This article is concerned with what I call the consciousness of John’s Gospel. This term needs to be clarified: I am concerned not with the psychological biography of the evangelist, nor am I interested in performing psychoanalysis upon this saint, now long dead. The possibilities of and for such historical psycho-biography and/or psychoanalysis remain open but, thankfully, need not be addressed herein. This article is concerned rather with what I call the ‘cognitive form(s)’ immanent within John’s gospel, including consciousness, construed primarily through exegetical engagement with the prologue (1:1-18) and the Johannine Jesus’ interactions with the Samaritan woman (ch. 4). The theories advanced by the late psychologist Julian Jaynes will largely inform the understandings of cognition and consciousness presupposed in this article, with Jaynes’ theories brought into dialogue with Fredric Jameson’s historical materialist hermeneutics. Hence, this is something of an experiment (what genuine exegesis is not?), an exploration of certain homologies between Jaynes’ thought and Jameson’s, wherein Jaynes provides a grammar for commentary upon Jameson and Jameson a grammar for commentary upon Jaynes. This commentarial dialectic in turn constitutes a grammar for commentary upon John’s Gospel in a (hopefully) innovative and enlightening fashion. It is thus a prolegomenon (and claims to be no more than that) to possible future directions in the study not only of John’s Gospel but also early Christianity and the history-of-religions more generally.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Julian Jaynes was keenly interested in both the nature and origin of human consciousness.1 In 1976 he published his magnum opus, his only extant monograph, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.2 In this text, he provocatively argued that consciousness emerged quite recently, beginning around the late 2nd millennium B.C.E.3 In order to properly evaluate this somewhat radical claim, it is crucial to understand what Jaynes means and – just as crucially – what he does not mean by ‘consciousness.’ Consciousness, according to Jaynes (1976: 21-66), is none of the following: memory storage; the pre-condition for concepts; the pre-condition for learning; the pre-condition for thinking. Against such understandings, a near-synonym for Jaynes’ notion of consciousness might be ‘introspection’ (as per Cohn 2007); a more precise re-articulation might be ‘subjective conscious interiority’ (as per McVeigh 2006: 203). Jaynesian consciousness, then, is: that cognitive form in which thought is considered intrinsic and internal to the human person and ascribed to her- and his- own agency, wherein ‘cognitive form’ (my term, not Jaynes’) is defined as the culturally constructed manner in which a human person experiences his or her own thoughts.4

Jaynes draws a sharp contrast between consciousness and an alternate cognitive form which Jaynes dubbed the ‘bicameral mind.’ One might describe Jaynes’ bicamerality as that cognitive form in which thought is experienced as extrinsic from and external to the human person and ascribed to agents other than said person. Such exteriorised thought manifests itself primarily as hallucinations, with the right brain engaging in decision-making and higher order thought, and then transmitting these decisions and thoughts to the left brain via ‘voices’ and ‘visions’ (Jaynes...
Thus these hallucinations function as the person’s ‘will’: ‘[v]olition, planning, initiative is organized with no consciousness whatsoever and then ‘told’ to the individual in his familiar language, sometimes with the visual aura of a familiar friend or authority or ‘god,’ or sometimes as a voice alone’ (Jaynes 1976: 75). Note that Jaynes must presuppose a certain degree of non-independence between cultural construction on the one hand and neurophysiology on the other, with the former affecting the latter significantly (at least in the particular instance of cognitive form); however, the physiological underpinnings of Jaynes’ theory need not detain us here (if interested, however, see Jaynes 1976: 100–125; Hamilton 2006; Kuijsten 2006c; Cavanna et al. 2007: 12–13.).

Of more immediately interest for the historical materialist is Jaynes’ proclivity to periodise the history of cognitive forms. Jaynes (1976: 126–145) speaks: of the period before the emergence of bicameralism, which he correlates with the hunter-gatherer groups of the late Pleistocene; of the period of bicameralism, which he correlates with the agricultural groups that began to emerge in the Neolithic and continued through to the bureaucracies of the Bronze Age (Jaynes 1976: 149–203); of the earliest period of consciousness, which he correlates with the early Iron Age and the beginnings of new political formations such as the Greek polis (Jaynes 1976: 204–313). With this periodisation in mind, Jaynes’ theory begins to read not unlike a re-articulation of what Fredric Jameson (1981: 76) has described as ‘the ultimate horizon of human history... [That is,] the whole complex sequence of the modes of production.’ Jameson (1981: 33) argues that ‘the problematic of the mode of production is the central organizing category of Marxism’; indeed, no Marxism worth the name can ignore this problematic (and a problematic it is: a series of distinctively Marxist questions, more than a series of distinctively Marxist answers).

Jameson (1981: 89) suggests that there is ‘a cultural dominant or form of ideological coding specific to each mode of production.’ On at least two separate occasions, Roland Boer (1996: 88; 2003: 96) has presented tables which helpfully summarise the correlations between mode of production and cultural form, as classically articulated in Marxist historiography. The later of these (Boer 2003: 96) included also the ‘spatial forms’ which best fit particular modes of production and cultural forms; we shall return to spatial form later. Here, though, as an initial step forward in the discussion, it will be helpful to re-write part of the earlier chart (Boer 1996:88), incorporating in a third column of cognitive forms a la Jaynes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modes of Production</th>
<th>Cultural Form</th>
<th>Cognitive Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hunting and Gathering</td>
<td>Magic and mythic narrative</td>
<td>Pre-bicameral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(tribal society, primitive communism or the horde)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neolithic Agriculture</td>
<td>Kinship</td>
<td>Pre-literate bicameral theocracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the gens or hierarchical kinship societies)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asiatic Mode of Production</td>
<td>Religion or the sacred</td>
<td>Literate bicameral theocracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AMP, ‘oriental despotism’ and tributary mode of production)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancient or Classical Mode of Production</td>
<td>‘Politics’ in terms of citizenship in the city-state</td>
<td>Early conscious society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the polis or oligarchal slave-holding society)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I have longstanding reservations about how Engels and Marx depicted the two ‘earliest’ modes of production; these reservations are less than relevant for the present discussion, however, for here we shall focus upon the latter two modes of production: the ‘Asiatic’ and the ‘ancient/classical.’ Due to their focus upon the emergence and development of capitalism and its sequel(s), Marx and Engels gave antiquity, and indeed pre-capitalist formations in general, less conscientious attention than they ultimately deserve. Moreover, the world has moved on in the last century or two, and with it the sheer weight of material we have from the ancient world. Still, Marxism provides a basic philosophical orientation towards the world, including antiquity, which I think quite robust and productive.\(^6\) Note also: although the problems associated with the term ‘Asiatic mode of production’ are well-known (cf. Dunn 1981; Hindess and Hirst 1975; Krader 1975), in this article I employ the term (sometimes abbreviated as ‘AMP’), not because it best captures the main characteristics of this mode of production (it certainly does not) but rather because it is so well-established and recognisable in Marxist historiography; it is a term of convenience, not of precision.

Jaynes (1976: 176-203) argued that those societies characterised by a lack of subjective interior consciousness and the existence of literate bureaucracies are theocratic, and that we can best describe these as ‘literate bicameral theocracies.’ Such theocracies come in two primary forms: the first, ‘the steward-king theocracy in which the chief or king is the first deputy of the gods, or, more usually, a particular city’s god,’ is characteristic of Mesopotamia and Mycenaean Greece, and probably also India, China and Mesoamerica (Jaynes 1976: 178); the second, ‘the god-king theocracy in which the king himself is a god,’ is characteristic of Egypt, some Andean kingdoms, and the earliest kingdom in Japan (Jaynes 1976: 178). Both sub-species are remarkably homologous to the ‘religion and the sacred’ cultural form which is typically said to characterise the AMP, such that Jaynes’ ‘literate bicameral theocracy’ can be construed more or less as another, more precisely cognitive, way of describing ‘the religion and the sacred.’

Early consciousness is characterised by a series of breaks from this bicameral mind, as people increasingly conceptualise their own thoughts as intrinsic to themselves and subject to their own agency (cf. Jaynes 1976: 126–313). There was thus a shift from theocracies to what we might characterise as more ‘democratic’ formations, such as the Greek polis or voluntary association, or the Roman Republic, or the Jewish synagogue; such formations better fit a society characterised by a subjectively interiorised and thus increasingly individualised consciousness. Indeed, only with such individuation can humanity really begin to think of society in terms of a conglomerate of people who can come together as a community; the emergence of consciousness is also the birth of the person in a sense even passingly familiar to us (post-) moderns, and without such persons, such demoi, democracy is literally unthinkable. Who needs democracy when the gods tell us all what to do? Consequently, with the earliest forms of consciousness comes politics in terms of citizenship, in terms of the demoi, such that early consciousness might be said to be more or less equivalent to that cultural form most dominant within what the Marxist historian is wont to call the classical or ancient mode of production.

However, the break between bicameral and conscious cognitive forms was never sudden, nor altogether complete; not in the past nor in the present (and who knows about the future?). Central to Jaynes’ thought is his idea of vestiges of the bicameral mind; indeed, Jaynes devotes
the entirety of Origin’s Book III to such vestiges (Jaynes 1976: 317–446). Jaynes interprets possession, schizophrenia and hypnosis all as vestiges of the bicameral mind. One cannot help but be reminded of Jameson’s argument ‘that every social formation or historically existing society has in fact consisted of several modes of production all at once, including vestiges and survivals of older modes of production, now relegated to structurally dependent positions in the new, as well as anticipatory tendencies which are potentially inconsistent with the existing system but have not yet generated an autonomous space of their own’ (Jameson 1981: 95) Thus ‘generic specification and description can, in a given historical text, be transformed into the detection of a host of distinct generic messages – some of them objectified survivals from older modes of cultural production, some anticipatory, but all together projecting a formal conjuncture through which the “conjuncture” of coexisting modes of production at a given historical moment can be detected and allegorically articulated’ (Jameson 1981: 99). Re-inscribed in Jaynesian terms, we can speak of how any given text is likely to evidence one or more cognitive forms alongside that which fits best with the dominant mode of production, some anticipating soon-to-be dominant modes and others surviving as vestiges of older ones. Thus, like polyester, are culture and its texts woven always from many cloths.

The transition from one mode of production to another is thus a period of cognitive revolution – correlative to if not quite identical (or is it?) with the ‘cultural revolution’ which Jameson (1981: 95-98) associates also with such economic transitions – wherein multiple cognitive forms compete for supremacy. Jaynes himself intimates the possibility of not only conceiving early Christianity in terms of such revolution, but of finding within early Christianity vestiges of bicameral exteriority. According to Jaynes:

> the attempted reformation of Judaism by Jesus can be construed as a necessarily new religion for conscious men rather than bicameral men. Behaviour must now be changed from within the new consciousness rather than from Mosaic laws carving behaviour from without. Sin and penance are now within conscious desire and conscious contrition, rather than in the external behaviours of the Decalogue and the penances of temple sacrifice and community punishment. The divine kingdom to be regained is psychological not physical. It is metaphorical not literal. It is ‘within’ not in extenso (Jaynes 1976: 318).

Of course, one might object that there is more of Paul in this description than Jesus. Possibly, but no matter; I quote Jaynes here not as the definitive ‘Jaynesian’ view on early Christianity, but rather as a hint of the sort of analyses made possible by thinking about Christian history in terms of the history of cognitive forms. In what follows I offer a series of such analyses as an initial prolegomenon to what could conceivably become a much larger, potentially (if it is truly dialectical) never-quite-complete, project.

**JOHN’S PROLOGUE**

I focus upon John’s Gospel, but only because it is the text with which I have most intensely engaged throughout my studies, and not because it is the only early Christian text susceptible to such analysis (it is not), or even the text most susceptible (again, probably not). Disclaimer aside, John’s Gospel is certainly an intriguing text for those interested in the history of cognitive forms,
for, as I will argue below, we can identify already in the first eighteen verses, the so-called Pro-
logue, a manifest tension between bicameral exteriority and conscious interiority. Moreover, this
tension continues to recur throughout the Gospel, in (for instance) the encounter between Jesus
and the Samaritan woman, a passage which I shall also consider in the discussion below.

Among Jameson’s central hermeneutical concerns are those dynamics which ‘make up what
can be termed the ideology of form, that is, the determinate contradiction of the specific messages
emitted by the varied sign systems which coexist in a given artistic process as well as in its general
social formation’ (Jameson 1981: 98–99); and I suggest that these ‘varied sign systems’ are always
already inseparable from, although never exactly identical with, cognitive forms such as bicam-
erality and consciousness; put otherwise, they are constructed within the context of the broader
meta-constructions that are the bicameral mind and consciousness. For our purposes, emphasis
within the above quotation must be placed upon contradiction. What differentiates a genuinely
dialectical exegesis from a non-dialectical one is precisely the attitude adopted towards contra-
diction. Once a contradiction has been shown to be more than an optical illusion – which is to
say, that it constitutes a genuine tension within the text rather than evidence of sloppy exegesis
– the non-dialectical exegete must conclude that the text is incoherent as it stands, perhaps due
to shoddy redaction and/or use of sources. Source and redaction criticism thus become the non-
dialectical exegete’s pressure valve per excellence, releasing into the ether the tension built up by
the contradiction.

Such release, however, is always illusionary, for the tension is only ever displaced but never
truly diffused. Whether the contradiction results from the work of an author, a compiler or an
editor, someone at some point thought the text was well and good as it now stands. Consequently,
the exegete – if she or he is to genuinely merit the term – must always at some point face up to
the contradiction, refusing any (inevitably and necessarily vain) attempt to cut the Gordian knot
with a source or redaction theory that merely relocates but never actually resolves the real literary
problem (and thus cannot cut the knot at all). I submit that when the contradiction is genuine,
only a genuinely dialectical hermeneutic is up to the exegetical task; one in which, as Boer (1996:
9) describes it well, ‘the dialectic moves continually to wider or higher levels in response to
problems or difficulties faced at the level with which one begins. The purpose is not so much to
solve the problems or avoid them but rather to locate them within a wider frame and ascertain
why they are problems in the first place.’

Beginning at the level of John’s prologue qua text, what apparent contradictions might trouble
the exegete? A first, apparent, contradiction has to do with the relationship between the prologue
and the rest of the Gospel. In a statement which has echoed throughout the last century, Bultmann
argued that ‘the Prologue is no introduction or foreword in the usual sense of the words. There
is no indication in it of the content or structure of what follows... On the contrary the section
forms a whole, and is complete in itself; it is not necessary for anything to follow’ (Bultmann
An initial instance: it is simply not true that there is no indication of what follows in the balance
of the gospel; by the end of the prologue one has a good sense that the gospel is about the story
of this man Jesus, who apparently stands in special relationship to both God and Moses. Another
instance: the section is indeed complete in itself, but only insofar as the eighteen verses – which
we exegetes describe as the prologue – contain the entirety of the eighteen verses which we exegetes
describe as the prologue; in short, to say that it is complete in itself is indeed true, so true in fact that it is a truism. A third instance: it is not up to the exegete to determine whether or not it is necessary for anything to follow; rather, the exegete’s task is to explain why it was thought necessary, by the author/redactor/Holy Spirit/whatever other authorial agent one envisions, for it to be not just anything that follows, but the particular things which manifestly do follow; in this case, the balance of John’s Gospel.

Now, if one focuses upon only the cosmological sections of the prologue and the historical sections in the balance of the gospel, one might argue that there is a contradiction between these two forms. However, in point of fact, the prologue contains historical material, while the balance of the gospel contains cosmological material. In using ‘cosmological’ and ‘historical,’ I follow Adele Reinhartz’s (1992) distinction between a cosmological tale and a historical tale within the gospel, between the story of Jesus as a cosmic figure and the story of Jesus as a historical figure. Reinhartz (1992: 5) is perhaps right to describe the cosmological tale as the ‘meta-tale,’ to which the gospel as a whole is subordinated (although the en-fleshment of the cosmic word could be construed as the subordination of cosmology to history); regardless, mere description of these tales does not account for their co-existence; it does not explain why these were put together – whether by author or redactor – nor why they were put precisely as they were. For that, one needs to undertake a properly historical investigation. As Alan Culpepper (1983: 11) rightly notes, ‘[q]uestions about how the story is told inevitably raise interest in why it is told and why it is told as it is.’

Within the prologue itself, a fundamental tension would seem to lie between the primarily cosmological material in vv. 1–5, 8–14, and 16–18 on the one hand, and the primarily historical material in vv. 6–8 and 15. Numerous attempts have been made to excise the historical passages, which refer to John the Baptist, from the prologue proper (cf. the history of scholarship in Keener 2003: 333–337). Bultmann’s explanation has been particularly influential: the prologue, sans historical passages (and also vv. 17-18, with their explicit reference to Jesus), was originally a hymn to the Baptist; the evangelist added the historical passages in order to ‘Christianise’ the hymn, making it refer not to the Baptist but rather to Jesus as the Word and the light (Bultmann 1971: 16–18, 78–79). Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Bultmann’s exegesis is correct; even so, it does not really resolve the formal problem, but rather offers a narrative account of events that may have generated said problem; and this Bultmannian narrative moreover begs the question: why did the redactor resolve the problem in such a way that the historical tale was introduced where it was not previously found? Welcome back to square one, having substituted ‘redactor’ for ‘author’ but having not actually addressed the problem of cosmology’s presence alongside history in the Johannine prologue.

I suggest that we should move the discussion dialectically to a higher level. When reading the prologue’s historical passages, one notes a central theme: the Baptist witnesses to the light coming into the world. Put otherwise, the historical witnesses to the cosmological. This, I suggest, can be understood as an example of what Jaynes (1976: 317–338) calls ‘the quest for authorization.’ As the bicameral mind broke down, as exteriorised thought ascribed to other-worldly agents gave way to interiorised thought ascribed to oneself, as the voices of the gods spoke less frequently, people sought out new means, extrinsic to themselves, by which to authorise belief and practice; they quite literally did not trust themselves. They turned to oracles and prophets, to auguries and haruspices, to ecstacies and ecstasy. Proclamatory prophecy of the sort practiced by John
the Baptist should be understood in terms of the bicameral mind: the Lord God of Israel, external to the Baptist, issued imperatives to the Baptist, and then the Baptist, external to his audience, relayed those divine imperatives to his listeners. Those who chose to follow the Baptist’s imperatives operated according to the logic of the bicameral mind, as described by Jaynes (1976: 84–99): the divine voice speaks, therefore I act. That voice just happens now to be mediated through the prophet, and not apprehended directly in the way that the bicameral mind apprehended the voices and visions. The Baptist as witness to God’s words and Word is the Baptist as bicameral vestige.

By way of contrast, the Word-become-flesh can be articulated in terms of the bicameral mind giving way to consciousness. The Jesus of the prologue represents the apogee of interiorised consciousness: the Word is not just inside him, but he in fact is the Word. 1:17 draws attention to an implication consequent to this indwelling of the Word: with the divine Word – and thus also the divine words – dwelling fully within oneself, what need is there for that set of exteriorised thoughts known as the Mosaic Law? Frequently, contemporary scholars assume that any contrasts between Moses and Jesus constitute evidence of identity politics; perhaps they do; perhaps they do not. Regardless, we would do well to recognise with Jameson that ‘the authority of such methods [as analysis of identity politics] springs from their faithful consonance with this or that local law of a fragmented social life, this or that subsystem of a complex and mushrooming cultural superstructure’ (Jameson 1981: 10). Although 1:17 might indeed provide evidence for ancient identity politics, analysis of such politics does not exhaust the interpretative potential offered up to us 21st century readers.

Turning toward a horizon broader than that of identity politics (and one much closer to Jameson’s untranscendable horizon, that ‘whole complex sequence of the modes of production’ [Jameson 1981: 76]) one notes Jaynes’ (1976: 301, 318) suggestion that the Mosaic Law represents a sort of half-way house between bicameral exteriority and conscious interiority: no longer able to hear the voices, the ancient Israelites sought external authorisation in the written word; eventually, however, as the Jewish people became increasingly acclimated to conscious interiority, they became increasingly ambivalent towards the need for and role of such exteriorised authorisation. Jaynes (1976: 318) highlights Jesus’ place in this emerging ambivalence; however, in 1:17 it is not so much that exteriorised authorisation is displaced by interiorised consciousness but that Torah as exteriorised authority is replaced by Jesus as exteriorised authority. Jesus, the fully conscious Word-made-flesh, might displace the Law, but it is not altogether clear that he offers his followers a full turn towards interiorised consciousness; one might, rather, read 1:17 as a bicameral attempt to re-contain the cognition revolution of which Jaynes considers Jesus to be a flag-bearer.

**SPACE, BICAMERAL AND CONSCIOUS**

Like the contrast between Moses and Jesus in 1:17, the gospel’s treatment of the Jerusalem temple can be, and often is, construed in terms of identity politics. Again, though, it can also be construed in terms of co-existing or competing cognitive forms. Consider the well-known conversation between Jesus and the Samaritan woman in chapter 4, wherein the following dialogue takes place:
The woman said to him, "Sir, I see that you are a prophet. Our ancestors worshiped on this mountain, but you say that the place where people must worship is in Jerusalem." Jesus said to her, "Woman, believe me, the hour is coming when you will worship the Father neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem. You worship what you do not know; we worship what we know, for salvation is from the Jews. But the hour is coming, and is now here, when the true worshipers will worship the Father in spirit and truth, for the Father seeks such as these to worship him. God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth" (John 4:19-24, NRSV).

There are a number of quite interesting details within this passage, when thinking in Jaynesian terms. For instance, as noted above, Jaynes (1976: 317-353) argued that as bicameral exteriority broke down in favour of conscious interiority, people increasingly turned to prophets and other individuals (oracles, for instance) who were thought to have a special connection with the divine; persons lack confidence in their own interiorised consciousness and seek exterior voices through a 'quest for authorisation.' The woman's recognition of Jesus' authority as a prophet (v. 19) fits this pattern: unable to hear the voice of God, such exteriorisation of thought having been displaced by conscious interiority, the woman (not unlike John the Baptist seeking out the Lamb of God) hopes to hear the voice of God through the lips of this prophet before her.

We should at this point consider Jaynes' theories about bicameral spatiality. According to Jaynes (1976: 150–160), spatially central to bicameral settlements or cities were 'the houses of the gods.' Indeed, this form of spatial organisation is so characteristic of bicameral societies in general that Jaynes (1976: 150) can say that 'whenever we encounter a town or city such as this, with a central building that is not a dwelling and has no other practical use as a granary or barn, for example, and particularly if the building contains some kind of human effigy, we may take it as evidence of a bicameral culture or of a culture derived from one.' In these houses of the gods, the god ‘was an hallucinated presence, or in the more general case, a statue, often at one end of his superior house, with a table in front of him where the ordinary could place their offerings to him’ (Jaynes 1976: 150). Such central shrines, including their statuary and other paraphernalia, are crucial to maintaining social order within a bicameral society, as they help ensure that members of the society construct their exteriorised cognition in similar fashions (cf. Jaynes 1976: 149–175).

This is precisely the spatial logic presupposed by the Samaritan woman: if thought – or, at least, thought that coincides with truth – ought to be exterior to the person and consequently identified with a god, in this particular instance the words of YHWH, and if YHWH is the god of Israel, and if YHWH needs a house in which his voice can most fully be heard, then it follows that there must be within Israel one house of YHWH per excellence. Such a theo-spatial logic is at odds with the spatial logic of interiorised consciousness. As cognition is construed less and less as exteriorised, and thus less dependent upon external aids such as the house of the gods or statuary, space becomes increasingly 'democratic'; which is to say that it must on the one hand accommodate the emergence of subjectively conscious individuals and on the other facilitate their communion with one another. If God is within us, then why need we go to a particular place to find Him? Jesus’ response exemplifies this sort of interiorised cognition: he does not reply to the Samaritan woman’s question as asked, but rather objects to the very presupposition...
that God needs to be worshipped in a particular place. This makes perfect sense within the context of an emerging interiorised consciousness: with thought no longer exteriorised, one need not go to a temple to hear the voice of God authorising one’s practice and belief. John’s Jesus and the Samaritan woman have not just differing worldviews, but more fundamentally move within different cognitive worlds, the Samaritan woman clinging more than Jesus to bicameral forms.

When this spatial logic and its correlation to cognitive form are correlated in turn to mode of production and cultural form, we can re-write the chart found in Boer (2003: 96) as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modes of Production</th>
<th>Cultural Form</th>
<th>Cognitive Form</th>
<th>Space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tributary Mode of Production</td>
<td>Religion or the sacred</td>
<td>Literate bicameral theocracies</td>
<td>Sacred space ('houses of the god')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancient or Classical Mode of Production (the polis or oligarchal slave-holding society)</td>
<td>‘Politics’ in terms of citizenship in the city-state</td>
<td>Early consciousness</td>
<td>Historical space (political states, Greek city-states, Roman empire)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus understood, John’s Gospel can be seen to represent a moment within the cognitive revolution leading from the once dominant bicameral mind of the once dominant AMP to the dominant early conscious mind of the subsequent ancient mode. The author (or redactor, or community, or whatever) was located historically within this long revolution, and although he tended to see Jesus as more representative of conscious interiorised subjectivity (although, of course, not the linguistic apparatus provided by Jaynesian thought) over and against the bicameral exteriorised subjectivity of those around him, nonetheless John himself experienced ambivalence about consciousness’ threat to Israel’s bicameral heritage. Moreover, John seems ambivalent to this heritage itself, an ambivalence which he seems to share with much of Second Temple and Late Antique Judaism, whether demonstrated in: Ecclesiastes⁹; Ben Sira; the Qumran corpus, for instance in the Community Rule’s ambivalence regarding the respective roles of angels on the one hand and human volition on the other in governing human action; Philo’s philosophy, whether one describes it as a Platonising Judaism or a Judaising Platonism; or the Rabbis’ highly self-conscious development of various exegetical and hermeneutical apparatuses for interpreting the texts (allegory and midrash, I suggest, are both forms of Biblical exegesis entering into the direct, if not always the full, light of consciousness). When considered from this perspective, conflicts of identity centred upon, for instance, the Law or the Temple, can be re-framed as struggles to acclimate to the demands of that increasingly dominant cognitive form which Jaynes calls consciousness, a form which emerged with the ancient or classical mode of production.

Although beyond the scope of this article, one could extend this history of cognitive forms into our present, late capitalist, age, thus recognising more fully that the human adventure is one... [and thus] glimpse the vital claims upon us of such long-dead issues as the seasonal alternation of the economy of a primitive tribe, the passionate disputes about the nature of the Trinity, the conflicting models of the polis or the universal Empire, or, apparently closer to us in time, the dusty parliamentary and journalistic polemics of the nineteenth century.
nation-states. These matters can recover their original urgency for us only if they are retold within the unity of a single great collective story (Jameson 1981: 19).

Jaynes’ work, I argue, provides a solid starting point for speaking about cognition’s part within this story, a starting point which releases considerable creative energy and makes it possible to say things about John’s Gospel – nay, the entire New Testament – which we could not say before. Moreover, the single great collective human story incorporates not only the New Testament but the broader entirety of the Israelite-become-Abrahamic religious traditions – indeed, all religious traditions – and, it turns out, us (post-) moderns also.

ENDNOTES


2 It is known that at the time of his death in 1997 Jaynes was writing on a ‘sequel’ to Origins, tentatively entitled The Consequences of Consciousness. For several years, and without success, Marcel Kuijsten, founder and executive director of the Julian Jaynes Society, has searched for any extant manuscripts of this second volume (cf. Kuijsten 2006b).

3 Jaynes’ primary data for the emergence of consciousness comes from the Greek and Hebrew literary traditions, although he does make a few observations references regarding the Indian and Chinese traditions (cf. Jaynes 1976: 162–163, 313).

4 Cognitive form should not be identified with Jameson’s concept of ‘cognitive mapping,’ the latter being more or less a synonym in Jameson’s usage for ‘ideology’ (cf. Jameson 1988, 1991: 51–54; also, Boer 1996: 55); my apologies for any potential confusion these similar-sounding terms may create.


6 Of recent efforts to re-think the modes of production, or ‘historical phases,’ of the ancient world through explicitly Marxist lenses, Diakonoff (1999): 10–55 is particularly promising. However, I do not bring Diakonoff into the discussion as the waters are already murky enough with both Jaynes and Jameson in the mix. Deeper engagement with Diakonoff would, I suspect, lead to a re-articulation and reframing of the overall argument posited herein. While this might be for the better, I am certain it would not call said argument into question.

7 Cf. the wry observations about what drives contemporary New Testament scholarship’s at times knee-jerk tendency to rescue Paul from his own interpreters in Boer (2009: 137–140).

8 Jameson, too, has written extensively on the nature of dialectical thinking. Cf. especially Jameson 2009.

9 Indeed, Jaynes (1976: 295-296) explicitly cites Ecclesiastes as the most ‘conscious’ text within the Hebrew Bible.

REFERENCES


