‘ASLEEP BY GRIEF’ (LK 22: 45)
READING FROM THE BODY AT THE CROSSROADS OF NARRATOLOGY AND NEW HISTORICISM

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In his recent book *Narrative Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Narratology*, Daniel Punday proposed to think the crossing between the contingent reading of New Historicism and the general reading of Narratology through the concept of a ‘corporeal narratology’. This proposition can allow us to think together History and Poetics, separated by W. Booth and his followers. The paper proposes first of all to understand this separation as one of the last effects of the modernist dislocation of the language, as M. Foucault has analysed it. Secondly, the paper tries to decipher the arrival of so-called ‘narrative criticism’ in the biblical sciences, and to evaluate in which measure a corporeal narratology can help thinking together History and Poetics in this field of research. Finally, the Lukan mention of the disciples ‘asleep by grief’ (Lk 22:45) will serve as illustration: generally underestimated, this expression signals a turning-point in the Lukan topic of ‘eyewitnesses’ (cf. Lk 1: 2). A corporeal struggle can be read in Luke-Acts from the beginning of the Gospel that considers ‘many have laid hands on’ (Lk 1: 1).

Tout ce que je fais, surtout quand j’écris, ressemble à ce jeu de colin-maillard: celui qui écrit, toujours à la main, même quand il se sert de machines, tend la main comme un aveugle pour chercher à toucher celui ou celle qu’il pourrait remercier pour le don d’une langue, pour les mots mêmes dans lesquels il se dit prêt à rendre grâce (Jacques Derrida).

I. INTRODUCTION: RE-READING WAYNE BOOTH’S PREFACE OF 1961

Reading the preface of Wayne Booth’s famous *The Rhetoric of Fiction* remains interesting, more than forty years later. This preface seems to have been programmatic of the next developments of literary criticism. He affirms:

I am aware that in pursuing the author’s means of controlling his reader, I have arbitrarily isolated a technique from all of the social and psychological forces that affect authors and readers (Booth 1961: I).

This sentence clearly announced the future emergence of Reader-Response Criticism and of New Historicism, as returns of both dimensions previously put aside by Wayne Booth: readers and History, in reaction to the omnipresent implied author. In the 80’s these two new trends emerged in literary criticism: the role of the reader and the weight of the interpretive communities have been masterly demonstrated by Stanley Fish (1980) in *Is there a Text in this class?*; the influence of socio-historical parameters on texts and readers has been cleverly illustrated by Stephen Greenblatt (1980) in *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*. 
STANLEY FISH AND READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM

Considering deconstructive reading as ‘a universe of absolute free play in which everything is indeterminate and undecidable’ Fish (1980: 268) started from the observation that readers can agree about the sense of a text, and elaborated the theory of the interpretive strategies which always influence the way we read: the limits of interpretation are established by the need of recognition of every single reader by an interpretive community. Fish narrates, for example, the following anecdote to illustrate his theory: after having given a lesson on literary critics, Fish decided one day to leave a list of scholars’ names written on the blackboard for the following students, who were attending a course on 17th century religious poetry. Without hesitation, Fish proposed that these students give an interpretation of the ‘religious poem’ written on the blackboard. And also without hesitation, the students interpreted the list of scholar’s names as a wonderful religious poem of the 17th century, trying to outdo one another with suggestions (Fish, 1980: 322–335). This anecdote summarises what Fish pointed out as the influence of the interpretive strategies on reading and readers.

Fish’s subtle and provoking essay has often been misinterpreted by biblical critics, who too rapidly put the term ‘interpretive communities’ into a frame of faith.1 To give a personal brief evaluation of Fish, I shall say on the one hand that socio-historical concerns can be integrated easily to Fish’s theory, which is precisely what Peter Rabinowitz (1987) and Steven Mailloux (1989) have done. But on the other hand, Fish neglected the problematic of the artefact. In the preceding anecdote, we should notice that there were words written on a blackboard, that there was a ‘support’ to the text: if we expand Fish’s test temporally, one can say that the students could have later confronted the demand of their teacher with other data, looking for a manuscript of the alleged poem, for example. In every act of literary or historical interpretation, the existence of the artefact attests to the possibility of seeing the reading or the reader reoriented by the encounter with a witness, to whom the artefact offers a trace: this artefact is usually a manuscript, but can also be a picture, a sculpture or any kind of object. A metaphor of this encounter between the interpreter and the witness has been cleverly proposed by François Hartog (2003: 61), and already suggested by Hannah Arendt: the encounter between Ulysses and the aede Demodocos in the Odyssey. At a banquet, Ulysses reproaches the blind Demodocos for singing too perfectly (lian kata kosmon) the destiny of the Greeks (Odyssea VIII, 489). By these words, Ulysses challenges the way in which Demodocos interprets the story. If Demodocos can be seen as the reader who ‘sings’ a text, who interprets a story, Ulysses represents the witness who can interrupt the ‘song’ of the reader(s). The present article will use this metaphorical background in the third part to try and overcome what Wayne Booth himself had stigmatised as ‘an arbitrarily isolated technique’ (Booth 1961: I): the way in which New Criticism had put aside both readers and History.

STEPHEN GREENBLATT AND THE NEW HISTORICISM

Stephen Greenblatt focused on what can condition readings, focusing specifically on historical parameters: this trend in literary criticism is inspired by the works of Michel Foucault, historian Hayden White and anthropologist Clifford Geertz.2 New Historicism stresses the links between fiction and reality and signals the return to historical concerns in reaction to a way of reading that is universalising and that would deny any historical contingency. Greenblatt presents himself
on an interdisciplinary platform. He tries to draw together different literary productions from a single socio-historical context: novels, anecdotes, historical reports, and letters are all legitimate artefacts for study. Similarly in the field of biblical studies Daniel Boyarin (1993) suggested reading the Jewish traditions of the aggadah and of the halakhah together, this allowed him to understand the androcentrism of the Talmud in a wider context.

We can say that, in the same way as for Reader-response Criticism, even if New Historicism has been thought of independently of New Criticism and Narratology, it is intrinsically linked with them, and with the first choices of Wayne Booth. It is interesting to keep in mind that Stephen Greenblatt (1980), in Renaissance Self-Fashioning, labels his own project not ‘New Historicism’, but a ‘Poetics of culture’ (p.5). Later New Historicism’s development deepened the split from the poetical dimension, but Robert Alter (2001: 45) strongly emphasised the return of a poetical concern in one of Stephen Greenblatt’s latest books: Hamlet in Purgatory (2001). This step probably signals that it is time for New Historicism to move in the direction of a cultural poetics; or, in other words, it would be now to the advantage of literary criticism to gather together the concerns of Poetics, History and readers in a ‘corporeal narratology’, as the young literary critic Daniel Punday proposes. The second part of this article will present this ‘corporeal narratology’; the third part will evoke on the one hand the reception of literary concerns in the biblical field, and on the other hand it will suggest that literary and historical concerns have to meet at the crossroads of History and Poetics; and finally, the fourth part will apply these methodological reflexions to an expression to be found in Luke 22:45, where the disciples are ‘asleep by grief’, apo tès lupès.

II. DANIEL PUNDAY AND THE PROPOSITION OF A ‘CORPOREAL NARRATOLOGY’: A BODILY ROOTING OF THE FOUCAUDIAN ANALYSIS

The literary scholar D. Punday underlines:

the concept of fictional worlds developed over the last twenty years in narratology [is] a response to structuralist emphasis on the anti-referential, self-contained quality of texts as sign-systems (Punday 2003: 12).³

In reaction to this fictional accent in Narratology, literary criticism saw the emergence of New Historicism:

Narratology constructs abstract, generalized models of narrative, but […] has had difficulty dealing with the concrete historical object. […] New Historicism, conversely, develops a nuanced understanding of this object, but has made no attempt to generalize its analysis (Punday 2003: 9).⁴

The roots of the ideas of ‘fictional worlds’ are to be found for D. Punday in the early 18th century, in the development of embryology (note: that is precisely the time where the definition of an ‘apocryphal corpus’ appeared): the idea of ‘accidental’ combinations of both female egg and male sperm had as a consequence the claim for the moral and philosophical validity of the European novel as a fictional narrative (Punday 2003: 11–12). Resulting from this analysis, D. Punday defends the following thesis:
Modern storytelling, defined by the ‘rise of the novel’ in the eighteenth century, depends in part upon the emergence of scientific culture and resulting changes in our thinking about the body (Punday 2003: IX).

These observations lead Punday to affirm that ‘our encounter with texts is always mediated by the corporeality of bodies, which provides an inevitable model for textual hermeneutics in general’ (Punday 2003: IX). He develops this thesis under the concept of a ‘corporeal narratology’, which traces the historical links between narratologies and the ways of imaging the body in different cultures and periods, until today: he tries to characterise our present conception of the human body, in Western culture, by saying that we have a culture marked by the new genetic discoveries and the cyber-world, where the body is seen as

a combination of genetic material with its own logic and meaning; we may well begin to see more fiction in which the characters are not taken as independent but rather as the product of other forces that are themselves the ‘starting point’ for the narrative (Punday 2003: 51).

This original essay seems to be one of the first to look for the historical conditions of narrative discourse. It moreover allows us to understand more deeply the double turn in the Western episteme at the 17th and 19th centuries, as enunciated by Foucauldian analysis. Michel Foucault asserts:

This archaeological inquiry has revealed two great discontinuities in the episteme of Western culture: the first inaugurates the Classical age (roughly half-way through the seventeenth century) and the second, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, marks the beginning of the modern age (Foucault 1973: XXII).

These discontinuities are expressed by changes in the perception of language: until the end of the 16th century, similarity was the leading factor of exegesis and of interpretation (p. 32); language was not only understood as a system of signs, but rather as an ‘opaque, mysterious, closed on itself’ thing (p. 49). For Foucault, there emerges a binary disposition of the signs (signifians – significatum) in the 17th century, which indicates the separation between words and things: discourse is no more than what it tells (p. 58). As illustration of this phenomenon in the classical Age, we can evoke the mathematician Euler, summoned to give a proof of the existence of God: he simply answers ‘ει = -1’ arguing from the beauty of transcendental numbers (Prickett 2002: 83). In the classical Age, language is perceived as even the equivalent of God. But, following Foucault’s analysis, 19th century language takes its revenge over this equation: the episteme is at this time dominated by History, which progressively imposes its rules, and by historical philology, which considers language as an object (Foucault 1973: 298). But during the same period, language also recovers its freedom in the world of Literature (p. 43).

For Foucault, words have again found their weight and their density in the 19th century, but in a dispersed mode, different for the philologist, the analyst, the writer (p. 315): the separation between fiction and reality, as well as between History and Literature, is accomplished. Punday’s theory allows us to understand that this division has not only been provoked by the domestication of language in the Western episteme, but also by the less perceptible level of the corporeal, and
by the complex perception of the human being by himself in a given culture, at the precise place where life tries to win over un-life or death: the conception of a human being. By emphasising the historical, cultural and literary concept of body, Punday offers, in my opinion, a key concept; one where both general categories and historical contingencies can meet. From this concept, we could try to think again the Aristotelian aporia on the link between History and Poetics. Aristotle distinguishes Poetry from History along the axis of general truth/particular truth, but ‘did not go on to discuss the other half of this question: the relation between poetic or universal meaning, and particular meaning’ (Frye 1990: 64). Frye refers here to this famous statement from Aristotle’s Poetics:

For the historian and the poet do not differ by speaking either in meters or without meters. But they differ in this: the one speaks of what has come to be, while the other speaks of what sort would come to be (Poetics 1451b).

If Daniel Punday offers an actual starting-point to build a cultural Poetic, it is important to note that he is just opening doors: his essay would improve with a look beyond the 18th century as far back as Antiquity, where the question of fictionality has been considered in many different ways. This is a subject I will develop in the third part of this article. Punday remains fascinated by the very damaging separation of fiction and reality, as accentuated by the ruptures of the 18th century, as established at the second turn in the Western episteme and as Erik Auerbach illustrated in Mimesis, at the end of the Second World War. Punday reasserts Auerbach’s distinction between Homer’s work and biblical literature, but chooses in favour of Homer’s superiority (Punday 2003: 152–153), whereas numerous biblical scholars also use Auerbach yet establish the opposite point of view.6 Stephen Greenblatt and Catherin Gallagher (2000) nevertheless demonstrate the links between Auerbach and his historical context (pp. 31ff); and in the same way, Richard Walsh (2003) recently argued that Auerbach has been using the ‘anchor of Christian teleology’ to distinguish fiction from reality (p. 118).

In consequence, ‘the rhetorical definition of fictionality [has to be] pragmatic, in that its criteria are not ultimately inherent in the narrative itself, but are contextual’ (Walsh 2003: 115). The resulting challenge is to take on the Foucauldian critic without repeating the undue dichotomy between History and Poetics, and without mixing them either. Paul Ricoeur (2000) wrote an impressive essay about the task of writing history today, Memory, History, Forgetting. After having used extensively the works of Hayden White in his trilogy Time and Narrative, Ricoeur (1983–1985) realised that White told us only how we can not write History, and not how we could: consequently, for Ricoeur, ‘it is urgent to specify the referential moment, that distinguishes History from Fiction’ (2000: 327–328, n. 30). In order to express this quest otherwise, we can use the metaphor of Demodocs and Ulysses alluded in part 1: is it impossible to agree about the referentiality in order to be able to sing again? Are we facing only diverse witnesses always interrupting the historical song / writing? Are we only facing disarticulate members of an impossible common body of History? I am convinced that we can’t forget that Writing is only a pharmakon (see Plato Phaedrus § 274-277), but I am convinced too that we can not stop writing, because Writing is the only place that can give an identity beyond a discontinuity (Gisel 1986: 93). Consequently, in the third part of this paper we will try to approach the referential moment as a necessary step in order to be able to write: after having seen how the biblical sciences interact
with the methodological background evoked above, we will think how the body could play a role in the quest for this ‘referential moment’.

III. THINKING HISTORY AND POETICS TOGETHER: A PRESENT CHALLENGE FOR THE BIBLICAL SCIENCES

‘NARRATIVE CRITICISM’ REMAINS A TERM SPECIFIC TO THE TERMINOLOGY OF THE BIBLICAL SCIENCES

At just the time when New Historicism was born, the biblical scholar David Rhoads first used the term ‘narrative criticism’ for designating the appropriation of New Criticism by the biblical sciences: this fact has been underlined by Daniel Marguerat and Yvan Bourquin (2002: 15). It can also be verified in Leitch (2001), where we cannot find any mention of ‘narrative criticism’, fruit of the biblical sciences and of New Criticism. In my opinion, this need for a particular terminology indicates that the biblical sciences both followed and anticipated New Criticism’s evolution and consequences. If the biblical sciences indeed waited for the 80’s to enter into the narratological world, they also brought with them a concern for the historical references, which is reminiscent of New Historicism, born at the same time: if we compare two works of the early eighties, *The Art of Biblical Narrative* by Robert Alter (1981) and *Mark as Story* by David Rhoads and Donald Michie (1982), we can see that Rhoads and Michie subscribe, as does Alter (1981: 155), to the fictionality’s contract (1982: 4), but cannot resist evoking in the conclusion the historical frame of the first century, and the question of the reader (p. 140). Both questions are precisely avoided by Wayne Booth, as we saw in the first point of this article. But as opposed to New Historicism, the biblical sciences have kept the dichotomy between ‘history’ and ‘poetics’ intact while developing their own ‘Narrative Criticism’. This dichotomy in the biblical field dates back to 1753, when Robert Law published his *De sacra poesia Hebrorum*, the first text considering the Bible only as a literary document (Konstantinovic 1988: 17). Foucauldian analysis (see part II) allows us to understand the work of Robert Law through the frame of the evolution of the Western episteme: *De sacra poesia Hebrorum* attests to the emergence in the 18th century of the classifications and categorisations that will later separate History and Literature in the modern period.

To illustrate the persistence of this dichotomy in the biblical field, I will mention Robert Allan Culpepper’s reply to a recurrent reproach addressed to Narrative Criticism: to have transferred the poetical categories to evangelical literature. Culpepper answers:

this reproach passes in an anachronistic way over the fact that ancient stories didn’t make a strict distinction between history and fiction, a distinction that emerged after the Enlightenment (Culpepper 2003: 82; my translation).

This reply echoes perfectly the vision of Giambattista Vico at the beginning of the 18th century: the famous Italian historian based his *Scienca Nuova* on the fact that the mythical and poetical represented only humanity’s infancy, a humanity rising towards the lights of metaphysics (Vico 2001: 104–105). But many voices underline today how this dichotomy between fiction and history puts an arbitrary frontier in our reading of the past. Richard Walsh (2003) shows for example the responsibility of Eric Auerbach for maintaining this dichotomy after the Second World War: *Mimesis* uses the ‘anchor of Christian theology’ to maintain this distinction (118). Walsh considers
that the question of fictionality has been too long mixed up with the question of literary genres: in his view, ‘the concept at stake is not fiction as a generic category, but fictionality as a rhetorical resource’ (110); ‘a rhetorical definition of fictionality is pragmatic, in that its criteria are not ultimately inherent in the narrative itself, but are contextual’ (115). Saying that, Walsh does not assert that it is an illusion to speak about ‘fiction’ and ‘nonfiction’, but that this distinction can vary and is the product of a narrative’s frame of presentation, described by Genette as ‘paratext’. Consequently:

the distinction between fiction and nonfiction rests upon the rhetorical use to which a narrative is put, which is to say, the kind of interpretative response it invites in being presented as one or the other (Walsh 2003: 115–116).

To affirm that the distinction between fiction and nonfiction remains upon the rhetoric level is not very far from the preoccupation of Paul Ricoeur: how can we write History after the work and the critique of Hayden White (see part II)? This task seems today to be that of all the scholars of Art: I do not pretend to solve here this question, not even to draw a preliminary answer. I would like just to suggest that one step should be to read again Antiquity’s data about history, fiction, truth and reality. We could find in them new metaphorical backgrounds to avoid repeating Auerbach’s dichotomy.

THE NEED OF A NEW GENEALOGICAL METAPHOR TO THINK THE HISTORICAL TASK

A quick look at Antiquity’s data clearly shows that Antiquity’s readers, particularly at the time of the Second Sophistic period, were dealing with truth, reality, and fiction (Cassin 1986; Bowersock 1994), sometimes opposing them as Diodorus of Sicily, who does not seem to be very far from Vico’s point of view in his Historical Library I, 2, 2:

For it be true that the myths which are related about Hades, in spite of the fact that their subject-matter is fictitious, contribute greatly to fostering piety and justice among men, how much more must we assume that history, the prophetess of truth, she who is, as it were, the mother-city of philosophy as a whole, is still more potent to equip men’s characters for noble living! (Oldfather 1968: 9).

But sometimes truth and fiction have been thought together, as in this anonymous scholia on Hesiodes’ Theogony 98 which says:

The poet is able to console by saying that even Zeus lost his son Sarpedon and so on; because even if it is fictitious (plasma), yet it is to be understood as true (ós aîthes), and indeed in this way it will also console (Papadopoulou 1999: 206).9

Consequently, we now have to read again Antiquity’s data about History and Poetics without the glasses of either Vico or Ranke: Antiquity does not represent a simple stage of infancy for a humanity rising towards the lights of metaphysics. Diodorus already pretended to distinguish mythology and history, and even pretended that history could be ‘the mother-city of philosophy as a whole’. This domination of philosophy by history reminds us surprisingly of the 19th century,
as deciphered by Foucault: we can verify here too that, even if the Foucauldian analysis is so pertinent in helping us to read our recent epistemological past, we must not raise it to absolute status, because the tension, and even the opposition, between History and Poetics were already present, even in Antiquity. At the time of the Second Sophistic, an anonymous commentator of Hesiodes was nevertheless able to join fiction and truth: this diversity of points of view can be understood as various reactions to the heritage of Aristotle. François Hartog reminds us that the first attempt to write a ‘universal history’ originated as a response of Polybius to Aristotle (Hartog 1999: 111).

In order to re-read Antiquity’s data about History and Poetics without the glasses provided by Vico or Ranke, we need a change of metaphorical background to express the historical task on a general level, even if and precisely because this general level remains intrinsically linked to our culture of occidental scholars. The historian’s task is at the moment mostly represented by the metaphor of the mirror (Hartog 1980; Ginzburg 1999: 25), whose success is due to Lucian of Samosates (2nd CE), an author who seems to have influenced the German historian Albert Ranke. For Lucian, in How to write History, the mind of the historian has to be

a mirror, clear, gleaming-bright, accurately centred, displaying the shape of things just as he receives them, free from distortion, false colouring, and misrepresentation (Kilburn 1968: 63).

But no historian seems to have read this sentence in light of another passage in Lucian’s paradoxical and ironic True Story: the narrator of this ‘true’ story arrives on the moon, and watches the earth in an audio-visual mirror,

a large looking-glass... fixed above a well, which is not very deep. If a man goes down into the well, he hears everything that is said among us on earth, and if he looks into the looking-glass he sees every city and every country just as if he were standing over it (Harmon 1979: 281).

Obviously, the use of the mirror’s metaphor in the True Story shows what can be hidden behind it. Let us start from Punday’s proposition, i.e. to enter into a text from the body, to decipher the mirror metaphor: if the historian is a ‘seer’, he could potentially see everything, or dream of seeing everything, and he needs nothing other than his own mind to tell History, without using his hands, or his feet, contrary to Herodotus who was a traveller. The ‘mirror historian’ remains an outside observer, safe from any risk or responsibility.

I would like to contrast that metaphorical background with this one, recently proposed by François Hartog: the meeting between Ulysses and the aede Demodocos in the Odyssey (see part I), a scene that can be read as the first encounter between Poetics and History. François Hartog comments on the scene using these words:

Ulysses’ presence there (in Troie) and here (at the banquet) allows to attest that it really happened. Here appeared a new configuration, an ‘anomaly’, since in the epic the veracity of aede’s word depends entirely on the Muse’s authority (Hartog 2003: 61).
Instead of the lonely seer-historian, I propose to adopt this double figure as a new metaphorical foundation for thinking the historical task: the blind aede Demodocos, who tries to tell the story, and the witness Ulysses who has been there. The corporeality is hardly provoked by this metaphor: first of all, two people instead of one person signify that the limits between history and fiction must always be discussed and acknowledged. Secondly, entering into the historical task ‘blind’ should help us abandon the dream of the almighty ‘mirror historian’. Finally, the confrontation with the witness embodies the other story that the historian is always able to meet, through actual witnesses or through the artefacts of texts.

In a very similar way, the preface to the third Gospel evokes those who tried to tell the story as ‘many have laid hands on’ (Lk 1:1): in other words, many ‘Demodocos’ have tried to sing Jesus’ story, but the author of Luke-Acts wishes to give his/her own version (see ‘I too decided’ Lk 1:3). Contrary to Ulysses, the author cannot pretend to have been there: consequently – before writing his own ‘song’ and in order to be able to stop the other ‘songs’ – he has to make space for the ‘eyewitnesses’ (Lk 1:2). He does it in a specific way, which he describes as ‘parakolouthēkoti anōthen pasin’ (‘after investigating everything carefully from the very first’ Lk 1:3). But does the mention of ‘eyewitnesses’ (Lk 1:2) mean that Luke imposes in fact his own look, his own point of view, as Stephen Moore (1992) affirms: ‘where Look/Luke leads, the reader must follow’ (p. 142)? In Moore’s perspective, the Lukan reader can escape the author’s look only by his/her literary suicide: to stop reading. The fourth part of this paper will suggest that there are in fact different ways to look in the Lukan Gospel, by offering to read within a corporeal narratology a seldom commented expression in Lk 22:45: the disciples are ‘asleep by grief’, apo tès lupês.

IV. ‘ASLEEP BY GRIEF’ (LK 22:45): WHEN THERE IS NO MORE MIRROR

‘ASLEEP BY GRIEF’

No patristic father seems to have commented on the phrase ‘asleep by grief’, and historical-critical exegesis sees it generally as a transfer of Jesus’ sadness in Mark 14:34, in order to excuse the disciples’ sleep (Barton and Muddiman 2001: 955). But some scholars noticed that grief usually provokes insomnia, not sleep, and this common perception can be verified in Antiquity’s representations: if Achilles cannot find sleep because of his deep grief (Ilias 14), Socrates by contrast sleeps very well on his last night because he is not sad in the face of death (Crito 43b). The Testament of Dan offers even the expression opposite to Lk 22:45: to be ‘awake from grief’ (apo gar lupè egeiretai, Test. Dan 4:6).

How then can we evaluate this data according to a corporeal entry into the text? George Lakoff and Johnson (1980) clearly pointed out that bodily experiences are the basis upon which we grasp metaphors (p. 221), and I would like to argue that the gap between our common bodily experience and the expression ‘asleep by grief’ leads us to consider this latter as a metaphor. In other words, ‘asleep by grief’ does not literally mean that the disciples were grieving about the coming death or arrest of their master: my rejection of this interpretation is based on comparison with other stories, which precisely depict in a usual corporeal way the disciples as sad, and even weeping about Jesus’ departure (see Mk 16:10, the Coptic Papyrus of Strasburg 9-10, the Coptic Pistis Sophia I,4). For example in the Gospel of Peter: ‘Because of all these things we were fasting and sat mourning and weeping night and day’ (Gos Peter 27).
Even the Lukan Acts depicts a heart-rending farewell scene between Paul and the Ephesians (Ac 20:36-38), in which everyone is awake and weeps: evidently, the explanation of a personal and inner emotion does not fit in with the phrase ‘asleep by grief’ on the Mount of Olives, neither on a bodily and experimental level, nor on the level of textual comparison level. Recently, Annette Weissenrieder and Friederike Wendt have tried to demonstrate the opposite: 


(However it is only on the surface level of the text that [the disciples], by means of sleep, are separated from Jesus’ fate. Sleep, in the sense of a reflection of reality, can clearly state: they participate in Jesus’ fight against death, but they stay back.)

Unfortunately, they made two major methodological mistakes: first, they didn’t look for data about the link between sleep and grief either in the cultural background of Antiquity or on the concrete bodily level. Consequently, the ‘grief’ of the disciples is arbitrarily isolated as purely literary and theological indication. Second, they interpret the Hypnos and the angel (Lk 22:43) as two ‘helpers’ on a literary level, by referring quickly in a note to a semiotic approach (Weissenrieder and Wendt 2005: 121 and note 97). But the Hypnos can not be counted as character – or ‘actant’ – in Lk 22:39-46, because the word ‘sleep’ is never mentioned, as opposed for example to Ac 20:9. If one looks for an actant in ‘asleep by grief’ (Lk 22:45), it is of course the lupè. A precise narrative reading shows in fact that the plot of the narrative sequence of Lk 22:1-62 leads progressively to a total separation between Jesus and his disciples: if Jesus wishes he could have eaten Passover with his disciples before he had to suffer (see Lk 22:8.15), Lk 22:62 shows the inversed situation, and Lk 22:39-46 represents the turning-point of this plot (Clivaz 2003: 377). This narrative reading of Luke 22 is confirmed by the fact that the third Gospel presents at the Transfiguration a totally different notion of the sleep of the disciples: ‘Now Peter and his companions were weighed down with sleep; but since they had stayed awake, they saw his glory…’ (Lk 9:32). Here the sleep is presented as an actant, but the disciples are able to win over it; on the Mount of Olives, the actant is the lupè, and the disciples are surrounded by it.

What could ‘asleep by grief’ mean, if a reading based on the common bodily experience underlines the strangeness of the expression, and if the narrative elements lead us to understand this expression as opposing the attitudes of Jesus and of the disciples? Which interpretive background are we maybe no longer able to hear, because of our reading habits? In a very pertinent way, Catherin Kuller Shuger (1994) demonstrated that Calvin’s reading of Jesus’ agony evacuated all political violence, in favour of a domestic violence, between the Father and the Son (p. 107). The same interpretive struggle has affected until today the understanding of the disciples’ characterisation on the Mount of Olives: these are usually seen in Lk 22:45 as dependent on their inner emotions. On the contrary, Justin Martyr (2nd CE) reads the prayer at Gethsemane together with the scene of Jesus’ arrest, and understands Jesus’ trouble as the result of the ‘imminent arrest’s aggression’ (Dialog with Trypho 103, 2). Many elements in the Lukan version of Gethsemane point in the direction of an external violence, more than in the direction of a domestic violence:
for example the emphasis on the temptations (Lk 22:40–46); the absence of Jesus’ mastery of the situation as he is interrupted by Judas’ arrival (Lk 22:46); and the coming of the ‘hour and of the power of darkness’ (Lk 22:53).

But could we explain the sense of the metaphor ‘asleep by grief’ more clearly if the disciples are here shown to be sensitive to an external pressure? The nearest verbal parallel to ‘asleep by grief’ can be found in Is 50:11 LXX, in a context where it functions as a death metaphor. Moreover, the association of sleep and death is very common in the cultural background of Antiquity: the sleep (Hypnos) is a bridge between life and death, and sleep and death are often represented as brothers (see Wiessenrieder and Wendt 2005: 110). If we read the scene on the Mount of Olives with a sensitivity to political violence, we can use this metaphorical interpretation of sleep to see the disciples as ‘knocked down’ by an atmosphere of external grief, with Jesus trying in vain to invite them to ‘rise’ (a resurrectional verb in Lk 22:46). This interpretive struggle is confirmed by a corporeal element: if experience usually links sadness with a lack of sleep, by contrast doctors today designate by the abbreviation ‘SAD’, a seasonal affective depression due mainly to an external factor: diminishing light when winter approaches. This special type of depression can provoke hypersomnia, i.e. too big a need for sleep.14 For me, these medical observations fit in with the previous reading of ‘asleep by grief’: the disciples are reacting with sleep to the external approach of the ‘hour of power and darkness’. Listening and hearing the body has led us to grasp the metaphorical level of this expression, and to resist a well-anchored interpretive approach.

V. CONCLUSION: THE LUKAN LOOK

The scene on the Mount of Olives is very important in evaluating the rhetoric of the ‘eyewitnesses’ in the Lukian work, because the eyewitnesses are precisely ‘out of order’ at this moment of the story. The narrator nevertheless allows himself to tell a scene of which nobody can testify, as the pagan emperor Julian points out: ‘But who has told you, Luke (this story) about the angel?’ (Baarda 1988: 292). On a narrative level, both comparisons ‘about a stone’s throw’ (Lk 22:41) and ‘like drops of blood’ (Lk 22:44)15 are an evaluation and signal the presence of the narrative voice (Marguerat and Bourquin 2002: 133–134): for a few verses, the narrative voice becomes the only witness, while the disciples are ‘asleep by grief’. Because of the coming of the darkness, there is no possible mirror left that could see and tell the story. ‘Asleep by grief’ is one of the key moments where the category of the ‘eyewitnesses’ is reworked in Luke-Acts, in order to leave sufficient space to ‘seeing differently’, an experiment that Stephen’s death underlines in Acts 7.56 and that Paul expresses when he transmits Jesus’ words to him at Damascus: ‘for I have appeared to you for this purpose, to appoint you to serve and testify to the things in which you have seen me and to those in which I will appear to you’ (Acts 26:16).

So if there are eyewitnesses in Luke-Acts, they can not see everything, and further, the story does not need simple witnesses but people who can see differently: this echoes the encounter between Ulysses and Demodocos. In the middle of a story that magnifies the eyewitnesses, the prayer on the Mount of Olives leaves space for a poetical openness, where the referentiality is attested to only by the narrative voice. Should we consider, as Stephen Moore suggested, that the implied author imposes his/her look here? Or, in other words, is the Lukian author here like
a Demodocos, whom no one can come and interrupt? Recently, Paul Ricoeur stated that Poetics reveals aspects of being in the world that cannot be said otherwise; when it is poetical, in this broader sense than poetry or narration, the literary work provides a change of scene, defamiliarises, with the strangeness clearing the way to a completely new appropriation (Ricoeur 2002: 11).

I think that a ‘corporeal narratology’ allows us to enjoy all the cognitive advantage that we can get from Poetics, without renouncing the interruption of the witness: our human body can play the role of the interrupting witness, when no artefact remains to represent a witness. Our body anchors us in a precise time and location, and creates the need to touch the manuscript of an alleged poem written on a blackboard (see the critique of Fish 1980, part I). Our body allows us to enter into a text (see Punday 2003, part II), and to grasp metaphors (see Lakoff above): it invites us ceaselessly to try and understand others’ readings. Unique for each of us, but determined by the same biological parameters, the body ultimately allows us to understand why we sometimes read and understand a text in the same way, even if we belong to different times and places. Our bodies stand precisely at the crossroads of History and Poetics, and it is from this enigmatic location that we have to express ourselves, and maybe try to write history again. The third Gospel designates this enigmatic location as ‘the events that have been fulfilled among us’, ‘tón pepleropheromenon en èmin pragmatôn’ (Lk 1:1).

ENDNOTES

1 See for example Murphy 1994: 257, 264–266; McGowan 1999: 74, 76, 78.
2 For a presentation by a biblical scholar see Hens-Piazza 2002.
3 It should be clear that W. Booth is working to create an object of study – narrative fiction. He has projected backward to the eighteenth century and before, to the epic and to biblical narrative, in order to be able to account for textual dynamics evident in his contemporary writing (Punday 2003: 187).
4 Daniel Punday has discovered and practiced New Historicism with Catherin Gallagher. He also explores the links between Narratology and Reader-Response Criticism: I would like to suggest that narratology’s language of implied readers merely transforms the narrative model of distention produced out of the gap between internal and external time. We can say that the narratology of reader response criticism is simply the next stage of narrative plot, and that it continues the tradition of using the body to mark the gap between overarching and resisting narrative orders (Punday 2003: 112).
5 See Clivaz 2005a: 483–486 about the effect of this Aristotelian aporia.
6 See for example Patella 1999: 1, 179; Powell 2001: 2.
7 It is interesting to note that Paul Ricoeur (2000: 223–224) and Hayden White (1999: 42) finally propose the same writer as expression of an acute referentiality: Primo Levi.
8 See Clivaz 2005a: 488 for more details. Rhoads and Michie have published in 1999 a second edition of Mark as Story with a lot of methodological changes. If we want to think the history of the recent developments in methodology, we have to refer to the edition of 1982.
9 For the Greek text, see Gregorio 1975: 20.
10 This filiation has to be understood genealogically: Alberto Momigliano presupposed it, but it is not explicitly attested in Ranke’s work (Momigliano 1966: 216).
The sleep because of grief has generally been assimilated by the Fathers to the sleep because of tiredness, like in Mk 14:40.

One of the qualities of grief is insomnia, as Luke the doctor should have known (Patella 1999: 16).

See Bovon (1991: 485): ‘Diagrègorèsesantes dé (dé shows the contrast and dia-, ‘through’, the length) means that they have resisted sleep and have not lost conscious at any time’ (my translation).


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