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Current Organisational and Creative Transformations of Ukrainian Circus Arts

All circuses in the Soviet Union were united in a single state system which was stable and self-sufficient. When Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, that organisational and creative system lost its balanced structure. Current transformations of the circus system are the subject of this research, which is based on archives from the 1980s to the present day. In this article the author explores external and internal factors of change and their influence on the circus system. Artistic human capital is proved to be of primary importance for the circus. Mistakes in management have become one of the key reasons why the Ukrainian circus has been declining for the last three decades. The rejection of historically-formed national principles of the circus industry, such as the artistic conveyor system, the autonomy of the circus system, and its centralised management, have also contributed to the decline of the circus. This article analyses the destructive influence of the institution of private entrepreneurs on the artistic conveyor, which was the basis of the Soviet state circus system. The author proposes that analysis of the causes of decline can be the basis for further developing organisational and creative approaches to overcome the crisis in the Ukrainian circus industry and form an effective model for its functioning. Vladyslav Kashuba is a graduate of the Kyiv Municipal Academy of Circus and Variety Arts and holds a MA in stage directing for variety, theatre, and circus arts. He is currently writing a PhD dissertation, dedicated to the post-soviet Ukrainian circus, at the Kyiv National I. K. Karpenko-Kary Theatre, Cinema and Television University.

Keywords: circus arts, circus industry, artistic conveyor system, circus enterprise, Soviet State Circus, Soiuzgostsirk, Soviet Head Office, State Circus Company of Ukraine, Ukrderzhstsirk, Ukraine Head Office, circus artists, artistic human capital, Kyiv Municipal Academy of Circus and Variety Arts

Introduction

The circus is a form of activity in which culture and economy coincide.¹ To a large extent this is a consequence of its belonging to art and entertainment. It is worth mentioning that Vladimir Lenin put the circus on a par with the variety show and considered both of them as profitable enterprises. He also thought, however, that both forms needed to raise their artistic level, “clean out unhealthy elements” (by which he meant low-grade humour, artists’ high levels of risk taking, eroticism, and other vices of the bourgeois circus), and put in place a system of centralised management.²

The origin of the modern circus as an institutionalised cultural form that manifested its own codes of professional performance and industrial organisation dates back to the last quarter of the 18th century, when Philip Astley introduced circus-style performances in England and France. Spreading around the world, circus forms diversified due to the political environment, the artistic heritage, and the aesthetic trends that varied according to different geographic locations.³

Mobility is one of the fundamental organisational features of the circus. Its artists do not depend on a verbal element when performing their skills and this enables the circus to traverse linguistic borders. Moreover, commercial necessity constantly demands new audiences. In addition, the mobility of the circus is not only geographic and circus acts can also be introduced to other performing arts, such as theatre or variety. The circus is always characterised by an interdisciplinary nature, which results in its ability to have an innovative impact on other aesthetic domains.⁴ This influence is diachronic and extends beyond circus: many current social and economic phenomena share their roots with the innovative aspirations of the circus a century ago. No wonder that the innovative nature of the circus is one of the reasons for its popularity.⁵ Due to its mobility and seasonality, the organisation of the Western circus is relatively temporary (and here ‘Western’ refers to first world countries that were aligned to the western political concept, as distinct from the USSR and other socialist countries). Every season the troupe reassembles: permanent artists constitute its core, but new performers are also involved. It has a kind of “seasonal numerical flexibility.”⁶ The Western circuses (in the style of Philip Astley in Britain since 1768, and his emulators in the United States since 1793) were not originally mobile, but static and based in amphitheatres for equestrian shows. The first mobile tented circus appeared in the United States in 1825 and in Britain in the 1840s. In the United States the railroad scaled up the circus industry as never before. New features – mobility and *industrial scale* – required a clear arrangement, well-developed logistics and skillful planning.⁷

The modern circus in imperial Russia was not mobile at the beginning, either.⁸ It started in 1790 when Charles Hughes first performed his acts in the amphitheatres that were commissioned especially for him in St Petersburg and Moscow by Catherine the Great. During the 1830s-80s, permanent circus buildings were constructed in these two cities, thus consolidating the tendency for immobility. According to Miriam Neirick, the prevalence of fixed circus buildings was stimulated by European entrepreneurs and their domestic followers.⁹

Therefore, during the Russian Empire, the circus developed according to European organisational and creative patterns. The revolution of 1917-19 and the Soviet era dramatically changed approaches to the organisation of the circus.¹⁰

Immediately after the October revolution, a course was taken to nationalise circuses and centralise their management. As a result, by the late 1970s, the All-Union circus system had sixty-four stationary circuses, sixteen mobile tented circuses, six zonal directorates, which ran fifty mobile 'Circus on Stage' troupes, and thirteen zoo-circuses. The number of employees reached 15,000 people, including 6,000 circus performers and their grooms.¹¹ They were engaged in more than 1,000 circus acts and attractions.¹² The entire system was governed by the All-Union head organisation, Soiuzgostsirk (the Soviet State Circus).¹³ Taking into account the number of circuses and the huge geographic spread of their locations, it was possible to build a self-sufficient system where a particular act, attraction or program could circulate for a long time and always attract a full house. Returning to a certain circus a few years later, the old act was received by audiences as a brand-new one.

The main features of the Soviet circus system were the following:

1. *Artistic Conveyor* (artisticheskii konveier). This is an organisational and creative principle according to which the circus product circulated in the circus system. Both production and rotation of the circus product were united and coordinated by the Head Office (Soiuzgostsirk), who planned the staging of acts, attractions, spectacles, circus programs, and distributed orders for their production among the circus enterprises. As soon as a circus program was ready, it started to circulate in the network of stationary circuses, similar to the way an industrial product moves along the circular transporter belt of an assembly line. The Head Office determined the route of the tour, the order of the program's rotation, and also replaced individual acts in the program. Every program worked in each stationary circus for two-three months and moved along the circular route, replacing each other. The process of a program's production was also similar to an industrial assembly line. In the state circus system, every unit carried out a certain step of production, so a semi-ready product moved from unit to unit until the product was ready for performance. Then it moved from circus to circus, thus ensuring continuity of the whole process (production + rotation). This continuity is associated with the term 'continuous production' and therefore with an assembly line; in Slavic languages an assembly line is called a 'conveyor,' so the term 'artistic conveyor' came into use within the circus industry. The term is used throughout this article. One of the crucial features of the artistic conveyor is the permanent (not contract) employment of the artistic staff. In this article the term 'circus product' refers to all types of work within circus production: individual and team acts, large-scale attractions, thematic pantomimes, spectacles with plot, and divertissement shows.

2. *Centralised management of the circus industry.* As all circus enterprises including stationary circuses, Circus on Stage troupes, and all the other elements of the system were subordinate to the Head Office, it could plan artistic policy, systematise the routes of programs, save money on hiring foreigners, and provide

the market with products of high quality. The circus as a domain became self-supporting through the system of centralisation that was already in place in 1927.¹⁴ The Head Office optimised the processes of planning, production, and exploitation of product and thus ensured economic and creative stability. The state, as the owner of circus enterprises and organisations, controlled all activities within the system through plans, reports, and audits, and if it was necessary, the state provided the Head Office with targeted funding.

3. *Network of stationary circuses.* The revival of stationary circuses was a priority from the very beginning. (A stationary circus enterprise consisted of a capital (permanent) building and its service staff; it had no need to hire its own artists because the Head Office provided it with a ready circus product and ensured regular replacement of the product.) As a result, according to F. Bardian, in the late 1970s there were ten times more stationary circuses in the USSR than in the entire West.¹⁵

4. *Stability of the artistic staff.* Personnel issues were ranked high on the list of organisational and creative tasks. In the 1920s and 1930s vocational education centres opened in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kyiv.¹⁶ The further success of the Soviet circus was primarily by virtue of performers' achievements as they developed a distinctive Soviet style.¹⁷ In order to retain the artists, they were all kept as permanent staff of the Head Office.¹⁸

The Soviet circus complex was centralised, self-sufficient, and self-reproducing. All elements of the system were directly subordinated to the Head Office, to which every circus, troupe, or subdivision was exclusively accountable. The rotation of a circus product, according to the principle of the artistic conveyor, became one of the most fundamental achievements of the system; this helped minimise downtime of both product and venues. The main advantage of the artistic conveyor was the stabilisation of the circus artists' social status. The performers did not have to look for a contract every season because their work was planned and organised in advance by the Head Office. They went on a tour together with their families at the expense of the Head Office and they were provided with early retirement. This institutionalised planning for a well-secured future, retained artists in the circus, significantly smoothed staff recruiting problems, and thus positively influenced the productivity and self-reproduction of the circus.

The Ukrainian circus underwent dramatic changes in the early 1990s during its transformation into an independent system. In 1993, following the example of the former Soviet Head Office, Ukraine created an equivalent – Ukrderzhzhsirk¹⁹ (now known as the State Circus Company of Ukraine or the DTsKU).²⁰ It includes a program-formation department, a department of artistic and creative work, an international relations department, information, and advertising departments. Like the former Soviet circus, the Ukrainian circus system consists of three types of organisations: 'main', 'assistant', and 'governing'. According to their type of activity the main enterprises are divided into three groups: (1) stationary circuses (both summer and winter); (2) mobile tented circuses; (3) mobile circus troupes (for example, Circus on Stage), and other

permanent troupes, which tour only with their original circus programs.²¹ In fact, only the first two groups represent the circuses as such, in that these two groups, the tented circuses and the stationary circuses, own premises that are specially designed to accommodate circus acts. By contrast, Circus on Stage represents artistic troupes, which can be thought of as a 'storage medium' of the circus product. They normally perform on non-circus stages, such as community centres, concert halls, and sports grounds. The difference lies in the interaction between the venue and the product. Whereas the stationary circuses hardly ever have their own artistic troupe, the mobile circuses usually have a relatively permanent troupe (at least the core members are permanent employees). It is due to this practice that the tented (mobile) circuses belong to the premises and to the troupes at the same time. The peculiarities and periods of operation of stationary and mobile circuses are different. The stationary circuses perform in one place, constantly change programs, and work mainly in winter, whereas the tent circuses perform one program per season, constantly move, and work mainly in summer. The similarity between the mobile Circus on Stage teams and the tent circuses is that both of them show their own permanent program and product rotation is achieved due to relocation. The difference is that the Circus on Stage is a troupe (that is, a product), while a circus with a big top is both a troupe and a venue at the same time. In addition, the Circus on Stage moves from one place to another more often than a mobile big top and can work all year round.

Rehearsals are undertaken, and props, equipment, and costumes are created by assistant enterprises. The Kyiv Municipal Academy of Circus and Variety Arts (KMAETsM),²² which is a vocational education institution, can also be considered to be a supporting enterprise because firstly, it provides the industry with professional circus performers, and secondly, it creates a high-quality circus product.

A governing body, Head Office, is a separate element and its powers within the Ukrainian circus system have changed over time. In the 1990s the Head Office had the power of centralised management, but since the early 2000s, the Head Office can be classified as a main organisation rather than a governing one, as it has lost almost all managerial responsibilities. The current composition of the Ukrainian state circus system is set out in the table below:

Company name, location	
1.	The Head Office
	State Circus Company of Ukraine or the DTsKU (formerly the Ukrderzhzhsirk), Kyiv
2.	Troupes and mobile circuses
	Directorate of Mobile Circus Troupes (former Circus on Stage), Kyiv
3.	Stationary winter circuses
	National Circus of Ukraine, Kyiv
	Dnipro State Circus, Dnipro
	Zaporizhzhya State Circus, Zaporizhzhya
	Kryvyi Rih State Circus, Kryvyi Rih
	Lviv State Circus, Lviv
	Odessa State Circus, Odessa
	Kharkiv State Circus, named after F.D. Yashinov, Kharkiv
4.	Stationary circuses in the temporarily uncontrolled territories
	Luhansk State Circus, Luhansk
	Donetsk State Circus, Donetsk
	Simferopol State Circus named after B.M. Tezikov, Simferopol
	Yalta State Circus (summer stationary circus), Yalta
	Sevastopol State Circus (summer stationary circus), Sevastopol
5.	Production Enterprises
	Ukrainian Creative Directorate for the Staging of Circus attractions and acts, Kharkiv
	Kharkiv State Art and Production Enterprise, Kharkiv
6.	Vocational education
	KMAETsM, Kyiv

Table.1 The system of state circus enterprises of Ukraine, 2019. Source: Based on the materials of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine²³

As of 2019, the state circus system included seven stationary winter circuses that operate as independent legal entities; they are accountable to the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, rather than to the Head Office. There are five more stationary circuses located in the temporarily annexed territories, three of which are in the Crimea and two in the Donbas. In addition, the system includes the Directorate of Mobile Circus Troupes (formerly known as Circus on Stage until 2007), and there are eight troupes subordinated to this directorate. There are now no mobile tented circuses in the Ukrainian state circus system. During the 1990s

there were also two enterprises devoted to production: one prepared a circus product, and the other made props, costumes, and equipment. Currently, both companies are inactive, although they are formally listed as part of the state system. Finally, the state system includes the Kyiv Municipal Academy of Circus and Variety Arts (KMAETsM). All state circus organisations are accountable to the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, which provides them with funding.

The Ukrainian circus, which inherited the traditions of both imperial Russian and Soviet circuses, developed its own organisational model, which differs significantly from Western circus industry models. It can be described as a hybrid, in that it includes mobile and stationary circuses, seasonal and year-round work, and more recently, it has embraced public and private forms of management. Stationary circuses remain the property of the state, and artists remain employed by the state-owned enterprises, which are subsidised from the state's budget. Most circus organisations are still considered as belonging to a single state complex but this unity is a formality rather than real. In addition, the system has become dependent on private intermediaries who now control the rotation of the state circus product.

Integration of the private component into the state circus system is one of the unfavourable and unfinished transformations brought about by the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This process began in the late 1990s and was the consequence of the Head Office's inability to set up and properly operate the artistic conveyor. The emergence of private impresarios who exploit the state circus product in the state circuses was a spontaneous response of the market to failures in the management of the state circus system. (In this article the terms 'impresario' and 'entrepreneur' are synonymous; they refer to private 'players' in the circus market who function as intermediaries. As a rule, they do not create product, but they distribute it, often appropriating the main share of the income from the distribution of the state circus product.) Having a semi-legal status from the beginning, the private intermediaries still work in the 'grey zone' (a term that refers to the fact that they can exploit gaps in the legislation and make profit from the state-owned circus product.) To a large extent, their operations have contributed to the imbalance of the artistic conveyor and the destabilisation of the circus system. The instability of the current organisational and creative model, the overall inefficiency of the system's management and the lack of a realistic strategy for the sustainable development of the national circus art are raising concerns for the survival of the circus system. Since the early 1990s, both the economic and creative efficiency of the state circus system has been steadily declining; the artistic staff has almost halved, many spectacular genres have disappeared, and circuses have subsequently suffered losses. Evidently, the results of the first decades of independence are disappointing due to chaotic change. Lack of understanding of the circus's specific demands, on the part of both the government and circus executives, obviously accounts for this decline.

This article lays the foundation for the development of scientific approaches to the organisational and creative optimisation of Ukraine's national circus system. First, a comparative analysis of historic parallels reveals the

differences between the evolution of circus in the Soviet Union and in independent Ukraine. This analysis focuses first on the threats to the industry and the connection between these threats and external factors. Attention then shifts to the operations of Ukraine's national circus system; hypotheses are proposed about the action of intra-system factors, the most important of which is artistic human capital. The term 'artistic human capital' refers to circus artists who perform the circus acts, and, therefore, become inimitable 'storage mediums,' so to speak, for the circus product. The very nature of the circus product makes it impossible to separate the artists from their acts. As a rule, the act is based on the unique abilities of a particular performer, so it is impossible to substitute him or her with someone else. In addition, artists are often creators and owners of their acts. To a lesser extent, the term 'artistic human capital' refers to the production team, which extends to directors, choreographers, composers and so on.

Threats to the industry and their connection with external factors

Since the early 1990s, the Ukrainian circus has faced serious challenges. Sharp changes in the country's social and economic systems, decentralisation of management and funding, severance of economic and creative ties, inflation, and political instability are all factors that have contributed to the imbalance of the circus system. The economic crises in 1997-8 and 2008, as well as the start of military conflict in 2014, have compounded problems in Ukraine.

Transformations of the state circus industry are characterised by negative trends, and the most threatening of these are as follows:

1. *Chronic unprofitability of the state circus system.* The circus was one of the most profitable sectors among the cultural industries (such as cinema, ballet, theatre and so on) in the USSR.²⁴ Having been one of the financial donors in the USSR, in independent Ukraine it became a recipient of subsidy. Thus, in 1994, two thirds of the costs of the circus system were covered by the state.²⁵ 2015 was the record year when subsidies exceeded 85% of expenditure.²⁶

2. *Constant loss of artistic staff.* According to Ukrderzhzhsirk the artistic conveyor system needed 900 artists.²⁷ In 1999 there were about 460 artists employed,²⁸ in 2005 this number had reduced to around 360,²⁹ and in 2019 there were approximately 150 artists employed by the Head Office.³⁰

3. *Loss of the production complex in Kharkiv.* By the end of 1996 the risk of losing the Directorate for the Staging of Circus attractions and acts had already arisen, while the Art and Production Enterprise barely survived serving the Rostsirk (the Russian State Company).³¹ After all, both companies have not been operating for many years.

4. *Deficiency of the circus product.* The level of artistic skill and stage production are unsatisfactory. Although reports by members of the state circus system show the annual production of acts and programs, the number is not enough to cover the requirements of the stationary circuses and their artistic

quality is declining.³² The replenishment of repertoire also declined due to the conflict with Russia, which supplied an inexpensive product.³³

5. *Dependence on intermediaries.* The lack of high-quality state product or product centrally arranged by the Head Office forces circuses to cooperate with private entrepreneurs. Now they control the overall distribution of national circus product. According to the auditors and experts (researchers and circus practitioners such as Maksym V. Striha, Valentyn V. Solodovnyk, and Oleksandr O. Riznyk, Oleg Kij), intermediaries contribute to the misappropriation of government funds and spread corruption.³⁴

6. *Prohibition of trained animals.* Commencing in 2020, trained animals are being removed from circuses. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the bill with a transitional period of 5 years.³⁵ According to the opinion expressed by influential members of the circus establishment, the consequences will be fatal for the national circus.³⁶ Audiences for the Ukrainian circuses consist mainly of children and they are interested in animals.³⁷

7. *Decrease in audiences.* In 1987 the Kyiv State Circus alone attracted 907,000 spectators; the average occupancy of its auditorium reached 99%.³⁸ However, in 2016 the entire state system, that is, seven stationary circuses and the Directorate of Mobile Troupes, attracted 813,000 spectators. Over the period 2012-16 the average occupancy of the circuses' auditoriums fluctuated between 26% and 50%.³⁹ The declining audience trend contrasted sharply with the trends of the Soviet period. So, during the first twenty years of its existence (1919-1939) the circus audience in the USSR grew from zero to 19,000,000 spectators a year.⁴⁰ In the late 1960s, 40,000,000 spectators attended 60,000 programs which the Head Office presented each year.⁴¹ In the 1970s the sales reached 80 million tickets a year.⁴² Ukraine's share accounted for at least one fifth, that is, 16,000,000 spectators.⁴³ So, the audience of the circuses has decreased dramatically since then.

It is evident that the many factors impacting the circus industry have been external and beyond the control of the industry's operators. In 1991-2 the Ukrainian circus appeared to be without governance and artists. Having always been subordinate to the Soviet Head Office, Ukrainian circuses had neither the experience of independent work nor their own artistic staff. Everything was appropriated by the Russian State Company, Rostsirk,⁴⁴ a self-proclaimed successor of the Soviet Head Office. Ukraine failed to obtain its own portion of the Soviet circus complex, and here we are talking about the property (for example, the Sevastopol summer stationary circus that returned to the Ukrderzhztsirk absolutely looted and empty⁴⁵), human resources, intellectual and creative property (including acts and attractions, props, and costumes, of which Russia agreed to transfer only 40 in mid-1993).⁴⁶

The situation is in many ways historically similar to the one from which the former Soviet circus emerged. In 1919 the situation in Ukraine was much worse than in the 1990s. In the West the 'golden age' of the circus was coming to an end (according to Matthew Whittmann it lasted from 1830 to 1919,⁴⁷ and according

to Robert Sugarman, it lasted from 1875 to the Great Depression⁴⁸), leaving nostalgia for the times when travelling circuses easily attracted up to 80% of the population of the cities where they were touring.⁴⁹ In the Russian Empire, the circus began to decline before World War I, which destroyed the circus almost completely as many artists died and there was no chance to attract foreign performers.⁵⁰ According to Ye. Kuznetsov, the Soviet historian of the circus, there was no circus left at all in Russia by the end of the war.⁵¹ Lenin's decree for the nationalisation of circuses provided just a symbolic impetus for the rise of the Soviet circus. The implementation of Lenin's declaration required the creation of a foundation for production, for the education and training of artists, and for the staging of a new repertoire.⁵² In the 1920s the Soviets had to start from scratch, in contrast to Ukraine in the early 1990s, when there were about 100 artists, existing stationary circuses, the Circus on Stage infrastructure, production facilities, the circus school,⁵³ and, what is more important, the time-tested concept of the centralised circus system.

The Soviets' lack of artists in the 1920s was compensated for by highly qualified European artists and there was almost no staging or production of new acts undertaken within the USSR. Consequently, in 1927-8, an almost complete rejection of foreign product led to the decline in the quality of performances. However, in 1931-2, the artistic standard of performances rapidly improved,⁵⁴ with vocational education playing a crucial role in this.⁵⁵ By comparison, in Ukraine during the 1990s and 2000s, the shortage of Ukrainian artistic staff was largely covered by visiting Russian troupes sent by Rostsirk;⁵⁶ it is noteworthy that many Ukrainians worked in them. The Rostsirk retained the assets of the former Soviet Head Office (such as acts, props, and costumes) and it offered better conditions to its employees than Ukrderzhzhsirk (State Circus Company of Ukraine) could.⁵⁷

In contrast to the situation in independent Ukraine in the 1990s, the circus industry in the USSR steadily progressed both creatively and economically from the late-1920s onwards. By 1927 the Soviet circus industry had become self-sustaining, reaching its peak in the mid-1950s more than 30 years after it was founded. Undoubtedly, development was slowed down by World War II, when a number of circuses were destroyed and many artists died. Despite imbalance in the artistic conveyor in the immediate post-WWII period, however, it gradually improved. By 1950, absolutely all circus organisations were finally united under the governance of the Head Office. Strict centralisation of circuses' subjection to the Head Office, and a single artistic conveyor, soon brought the industry out of the crisis, ensuring self-sufficiency and, consequently, the conditions for development.

The Ukrainian Head Office (DTsKU) as well as the neighbouring Rostsirk have been trying unsuccessfully to take advantage of the artistic conveyor system for almost 30 years. The famous clown D. Alperov described the miserable life of circus artists in the pre-revolutionary period and their immediate improvement after the first Bolsheviks' decree.⁵⁸ By contrast, in independent Ukraine since the 1990s, the dynamics of change have been moving in the opposite direction, and

the working conditions of artists have consequently been deteriorating steadily, forcing them to emigrate.⁵⁹

Under similar circumstances, the trends in the development of two circus systems – Ukrainian and Soviet – are diametrically opposite. The importance of external factors (such as social and economic crises, and insolvency of the audience) is obvious, but their influence on the decline of the circus in Ukraine should not be overestimated. After all, the political and social conditions in the 1920s or 1940s were much worse than in the early 1990s, but the Soviet circus developed rapidly enough. At the same time, the period of its boom (1955-90) correlated with the general decline of the circus in the West.⁶⁰ That circumstance, however, did not impede the successful foreign tours of the Soviet circus.⁶¹ Naturally, those tours significantly influenced the development of world circus arts. If in the West they gave a boost to the new circus/nouveau cirque,⁶² in China they inspired the development of animal training and aerial genres.⁶³

Some researchers pay attention to such external factors as the wide range of entertainments and performances that allegedly overshadowed the circus.⁶⁴ However, in the 1990s there was no rapid spread of new entertainments in Ukraine. On the contrary, cinemas closed everywhere, and film distribution almost stopped, freeing up one of the most competitive market niches. In addition, the private sector formed and strengthened quickly. An example of this is Kobzov Circus, an organisation led by Mikola Kobzov, which built a network of mobile tented circuses from scratch without subsidies or state patronage and successfully toured all over Ukraine and Russia.⁶⁵ This occurred in the early 2000s, that is, just when the Internet and other new entertainments spread. Finally, nothing prevented the formation and success of the new circus/nouveau cirque during that period. The most famous example is Cirque du Soleil, which can be considered a Western version of the artistic conveyor system, because it used many organisational and creative principles of the Soviet Head Office.⁶⁶

Alteration of demographics is another significant external factor that needs to be considered. In fact, a decrease of the birth rate had a considerable impact as the circus target audience is primarily families with children, and the circus itself as an entertainment has a family nature.⁶⁷ However, private tented circuses are being developed in the country. According to the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine there are about fifty of them, with a market share of up to UAH 200 million a year.⁶⁸ The fact that the market share of private circuses is growing, even though the public sector has the monopoly and state protection, proves that there is unmet demand for circus performances. Therefore, it is incorrect to blame the demographic crisis for the decline of the circus system.

Thus, the crisis of the state circus system did not result from external factors alone, and it is logical to propose that crucial intra-system factors contributed to its failures. These intra-system factors are considered in the following section.

Artistic human capital as an organisational and creative basis

In the mid-2000s it became clear that failures in the state circus system were partly due to some intra-system reasons. The State Audit Service of Ukraine carried out an audit in 2007⁶⁹ and identified the following internal problems:

1. Unlimited duration of paid downtime for employees. Artists were paid even if they didn't work for months but their salary was lower than that of artists who worked. Usually, the downtimes were the result of poor management and artists suffered rather than benefited from paid downtime.

2. The lack of a mechanism to retain the product in the system, meaning that Head Office did not provide attractive working conditions for artists and could not prevent the outflow of circus acts which had been produced at the expense of the state. When artists quit, they took their acts to new employers (both foreign and private domestic) and the Head Office was unable to stop this outflow of the product.

3. Postponing the registration of the status of non-profit organisations, which exempts circuses from the land tax.

4. Lack of centralised coordination of the artistic conveyor, which led to uncontrolled distribution of the state circus product.

5. Involvement of private intermediaries, which in turn reduced the profits of circuses.

These drawbacks give rise to a number of assumptions about the reasons for the system's inefficiency. The identified problems can be grouped together according to several dominant themes. Issues 1, 2 and partly 4 and 5 are connected with the rational use of human resources. Issue 4, and partly all the others, relate to the lack of proper centralisation and control. Finally, issue 5, and partly 2 and 4, relate to the negative impact of private intermediaries.

This analysis allows the following assumptions to be made: the central hypothesis is that the fundamental problem of the system is the underestimation of its human capital, in particular, the artistic staff. The loss of skilled artists is equal to the loss of a product that is a 'fixed asset' of circus production. Performers work for the state's competitors, providing them with artistic product that is paid for by the state. At the same time, expenses such as payment for rehearsals, forced downtimes, and the maintenance of trained animals fall on the state system entirely. The following concomitant assumptions complement and develop the central hypothesis. Firstly, that the institution of private entrepreneurs is one of the main obstacles to the formation of a self-sufficient state circus system. Secondly, that the state circus system is unworkable without centralised management of the artistic conveyor and proper control, or in other words, without a competent and empowered Head Office.

At the beginning, the Ukrainian state recognised the need to establish the circus system as an independent institution. The system was led by the Ukrderzhzhsirk (DTsKU) and all the system elements were subordinate to it.⁷⁰ However, in the second half of the 1990s the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine intervened in the governing of the circus, despite the lack of specific experience or industry knowledge.⁷¹ It is no wonder that their governance was ineffective. In addition, circuses could ignore orders from the Ukrainian Head Office (sometimes unjustifiably, but often because they were unable to execute them), and they did not build effective communication with each other or with the DTsKU. This behaviour undermined the prospect for centralised governance. In addition to insufficient state funding, since the mid-1990s the Head Office constantly demonstrated its inability to organise a smoothly run conveyor, and thus it gradually disappointed circus executives. Downtimes and breaks, variable quality of the programs, and irrational distribution of revenues made circuses increasingly unprofitable. Thus, they were encouraged to look for the product by themselves and that contributed to the further destabilisation of the artistic conveyor system.

The Head Office realised the shortcomings of the system and its own inability to fulfill essential functions. First of all, there was a need to create the required number of full-length programs, but the artistic and stage work declined as it was costly and time-consuming. Circuses had no motivation to invest in production, as the product staged within the system was meant for common rotation, despite the fact that the cost of its creation was borne by the circus producer alone. Head Office did not have sufficient funds for production, so circuses were required to allocate some money to a special fund – this funding model had been successful with the Soviet State Circus. However, the Ukrainian circuses were unable to contribute enough to ensure the fund's effectiveness. Public funding steadily declined, and in the meantime, artists had to bear the costs of staging the acts, making props and costumes, purchasing and keeping animals, and so on.⁷² Their motivation to work in the national circuses was further reduced.

The DTsKU failed to retain Ukrainian artists. As 'storage mediums' of the circus product, the performers moved to Russia primarily, and later to other foreign countries. That often caused sudden failures in the artistic conveyor system. Between the 1990s and 2000s a private sector emerged and attracted the most successful performers. As M. Kobzov noted, it was the presence of a large number of highly-skilled artists on the labour market that prompted him to create a network of tented circuses with almost 400 employees.⁷³

Artists' access to the foreign labour market was an important factor for the industry. Firstly, the DTsKU gave the artists long vacations if they wanted to work on private contracts, but this caused great harm to the industry. As soon as the artists learned how to find employment abroad it was almost impossible to lure them back, and although performers were listed as employees of the Head Office, in fact, many were not engaged in the artistic conveyor system for years. Secondly, performers who worked abroad were the most qualified, so the national circus product suffered losses that were not only quantitative, but also qualitative. In this

way, the Ukrainian circus actually 'sponsored' its foreign and private rivals with artistic works of high quality. What is more, the 10% fee artists were obliged to pay from their income to the Head Office did not even cover the depreciation of the product.⁷⁴ (For example, if an artist worked for a foreign circus and earned \$1000, the artist was obliged to pay \$100 to the Head Office because the act he/she performed was state-owned as it had been produced within state-owned facilities and funded by the state, often including the props, equipment, and costumes.)

The situation was paradoxical: in the case of a desperate shortage of product, competitors got it on charitable terms. However, a direct ban on artists signing private contracts would only have pushed them to quit the DTsKU. Only competitive wages and working conditions could have slowed the outflow. On the other hand, due to the imbalance of the artistic conveyor, many acts were idle and thus increased overhead expenses, since the artists' 'downtimes' were paid for by the Head Office. So, it is not surprising that the Head Office decided it was reasonable to allow artists to sign private contracts and gain at least some income, rather than pay them 'downtime' fees.

At the turn of the 2000s, the inability of the DTsKU to operate effectively led to the emergence of private intermediaries. In order to exploit the product more efficiently, in 1997 the DTsKU first tried to provide its programs with program managers interested in making a profit.⁷⁵ This decision laid the foundations for private mediation. By that time, a wide range of insignificant private players flooded the circus industry market;⁷⁶ they were all independent and therefore they were in competition with the DTsKU. On the other hand, they became a reserve which the stationary circuses used to fill the gaps in the ailing artistic conveyor system. As for the DTsKU programs, their management was represented by the most entrepreneurial and experienced artists who had well-established personal contacts with circus executives. Another source of managerial staff was the above-mentioned private players, who had already established cooperative connections with circuses. Perhaps, the most important of their skills was the ability to negotiate with both the circuses' top-managers and the Head Office. The program managers sought to turn their troupes into commercial projects. Thus, they quickly became private intermediaries between the product and the venue, serving their own commercial goals rather than the state circuses' interests.

In such a way, the private impresarios appeared and were very motivated to achieve personal benefit. However, neither circuses nor the Head Office gained any advantage from that experiment. The industry did not benefit from the new formation either. Intermediaries actually paid small fees to rent ready-made acts. They did not pay artists much, but the DTsKU offered even less. Circuses' top managers, for their part, agreed to accept programs on unfavourable terms and as a result, some money was earned by program managers only.

The most serious drawback of the new system was its incapacity for product replenishment. As a rule, the acts and programs were distributed by the program managers with a minimum investment, where nothing but advertising was considered to be a necessary expense. The artistic quality of performances

declined as it was not among the top priorities for impresarios. At the same time, private entrepreneurs improved the repertoire of the circus network to some extent, and gave at least some earnings to the artists. The emergence of private intermediaries was a spontaneous response of the market to the lack of capable management within the industry. The new formation contributed to the circuses' independence and prepared the ground for decentralisation.

In the mid-2000s, the opportunity for a centralised circus system to be implemented, with a powerful Head Office, was once more lost. During the period from 1991 to 1997 there had been significant obstacles, such as general chaos and uncertainty, the Ministry of Culture's misconception of circus needs, lack of managerial experience in the Head Office and circuses, desperate lack of funding, and hyperinflation. At the turn of the 2000s the strengthening of private impresarios became one of the main obstacles. In both cases, the managerial inefficiency of the DTsKU resulted in a loss of control over artistic human capital. In addition, by taking over distribution of the product – something which was the essential duty of the Head Office – private entrepreneurs substantially discredited the DTsKU and the circuses questioned the very necessity of its existence. However, the need for a Head Office in the state circus system is obvious. Since the emergence of private intermediaries and the decentralisation of the system, the state of the circus system has been deteriorating. The most important process was neglected, that of self-reproduction, which mainly consists of staging work. In my opinion, it must be centrally operated from within the state circus system. The Comprehensive Program for the Development of National Circus Art in Ukraine for the period 1996-2000 planned the production of thirty-two new acts and attractions, with mostly group acts and complex genres in the plan.⁷⁷ However, the Program's funding was unsatisfactory. In 1993-4 the state funded the production of about twenty-five acts, as well as a really outstanding production, *Circus on Ice*. In that show, not only jugglers and acrobats, but also polar bears went ice skating by virtue of S. Gaidar's and O. Denysenko's efforts and creativity.⁷⁸ However, funding was barely enough for the most basic essentials of the circuses: salaries, taxes, utilities, and animal feeding. So, creative development was out of the question.

Another component of self-reproduction is renewal of the circuses' material and technical base. That task is also unattainable due to the intermediaries. According to some experts, the private impresarios control up to 85% of the overall turnover.⁷⁹ If the Head Office controlled the product distribution by itself, the circuses could be provided with that money.

Finally, it is worth quoting the conclusions of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, published after the financial audit in 2009:

the fact that 12 out of 15 circus enterprises that receive state financial support do not have circus artists in their staff evidences a decline. They have become venues where visiting artists earn money, and their payments cannot cover the needs of the state circus enterprises. At the same time, the State Circus Company, which employs 470 circus artists at the expense of the state budget (about 60 percent of the artistic staff positions remain

vacant), does not produce state circus programs. Mostly, artists work under a contract in commercial circus troupes. Fees under such contracts cover only 65-70 percent of the product prime cost, the rest is covered by the state funds.⁸⁰

Conclusions

Artistic human capital plays a key role in sustainable development of the state circus system in Ukraine. Some mistakes made by the Head Office while managing the artistic staff led to the start of the circus system's decline. The loss of artists inevitably unbalanced the artistic conveyor system; on the one hand, it resulted in a lack of high-quality acts and programs, and, on the other hand, it helped private intermediaries to form a competitive offer using state product. Due to private intermediaries, the Head Office was finally discredited, and it lost control over the incomes. As a result, the main organisational and creative task – to stage new acts and programs – was neglected, and the system's self-reproduction was paralysed. After all, intermediaries, as a rule, just 'parasitise' the ready-made state-owned product.

Artists returned to the 'pre-revolutionary' situation: they lost social preferences and guarantees as well as the benefits of permanent employment. They had to take over the staging work and production expenses. But circus artists themselves are able to prepare solo or duo acts, mainly. Meanwhile, most of the large-scale, spectacular genres that have always been a competitive advantage of the national circus are disappearing.

A constant call to improve and increase the training of circus artists seems to be a symptomatic measure. In fact, a lot of artists graduate from KMAETsM every year and their knowledge and skills are sufficient to work abroad immediately after graduation.⁸¹ The variety of modern circus genres requires multidisciplinary artists, who develop not only their physical and artistic skills, but also their cognitive skills, and who are ready for creative innovation.⁸² Such training is provided by the Ukrainian circus school, which is a legacy of the Soviet circus. It is noteworthy that the former socialist countries now provide the most successful Western circuses with skilled circus performers. Their first-class qualifications are a legacy of a socialist approach to funding, planning, and management in the performing arts and sports.⁸³

At present, the Ukrainian circus system lacks, first of all, a mechanism for motivating artists to remain in the state artistic conveyor. The search for such a mechanism is one of the central tasks in the optimisation of the organisational and creative processes of the state circus system. Secondly, measures should be taken to oust private intermediaries from the system. The state circus system must be saved. This would be possible if the state circus system is given the status of an independent state agency, financed directly from the budget, bypassing the Ministry of Culture. All circus organisations must be strictly subordinated and accountable to a single governing organisation. The state should monitor the system's effectiveness more thoroughly and select the top managers for the circus and the Head Office more thoughtfully. Proper control over the system could be

ensured by an elected collegial committee that may consist of representatives of labour collectives and the circus community. If it had the sufficient number of members and frequent re-elections, risks of corruption could be minimised. The principle of a single artistic conveyor has proved its viability both in the socialist economy and in the capitalist West (for example, the Cirque du Soleil). Instead of rejecting the successful achievements of predecessors, it is necessary to adapt them properly in the new environment.

¹ Martin Parker, "Organizing the Circus: The Engineering of Miracles," *Organization Studies*, Vol. 32, no. 4 (April 2011): 2. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840611403668>. Accessed on December 20, 2019.

² "Декрет СНК об объединении театрального дела", *Электронная библиотека исторических документов* ("Decree on the Unification of Theatrical Concern," *Electronic Library of Historical Documents*), August 26, 1919, 72. <http://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/16186-26-avgusta-dekret-snk-ob-obedinenii-teatralnogo-dela>. Accessed on January 22, 2020. [In Russian].

³ Gillian Arrighi, "Circus studies: where to next?," *Popular Entertainment Studies*, Vol. 6, no. 1 (2015): 63-64. <https://nvaajs.newcastle.edu.au/ojs/index.php/pes/article/view/155>. Accessed on February 14, 2020.

⁴ Ibid: 64-65.

⁵ Gillian Arrighi, "The circus and modernity: A commitment to 'the newer' and 'the newest'," *Early Popular Visual Culture*, Vol. 10, no. 2 (2012): 169-170. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17460654.2012.664747>. Accessed on December 22, 2019.

⁶ Martin Parker, "Organizing the Circus": 9.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Within the field of circus studies researchers consider the 'modern circus' (or 'traditional circus') as the circus from Philip Astley up to the present day. Soviet circuses, Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey, or the well-known Italian Circo Moira Orfei, despite being vastly different to each other, all belong to the broad term 'modern circus.'

⁹ Miriam Neirick, *When pigs could fly and bears could dance: a history of the Soviet circus* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Pres, 2012), 6-7.

¹⁰ Robert Sugarman, "Russian circus, American circus: politics, economics and performance," in *The many worlds of circus*, ed. Robert Sugarman (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), 191-192.

¹¹ Феодосий Г. Бардиан, *Организация и планирование циркового производства*. Feodosij G. Bardian, *Organisation and Planning of Circus Industry* (Moscow: GITIS, 1981). Retrieved from: <http://www.ruscircus.ru/science/orgcirc.shtml>. Accessed on February 10, 2020. [In Russian].

¹² Феодосий Г. Бардиан, *Советский цирк на пяти континентах*. Feodosij G. Bardian, *Soviet Circus on the Five Continents* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1977), retrieved from: <http://www.ruscircus.ru/science/orgcirc.shtml>. Accessed on February 1, 2020. [In Russian].

¹³ An abbreviation for "Soiuznyj Gosudarstvennyj Tsirk" [All-Union Association of State Circuses (translation of M. Neirick)].

¹⁴ Евгений М. Кузнецов, "Советский цирк" в Евгений М. Кузнецов, *Цирк. Происхождение. Развитие. Перспективы*. Yevgenij M. Kuznetsov, "Soviet Circus," in Yevgenij M. Kuznetsov, *Circus. Origin. Development. Prospects* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1971), retrieved from: <http://www.ruscircus.ru/glav23>. Accessed on February 12, 2020. [In Russian].

¹⁵ See note 11.

¹⁶ Роберт Е. Славский, «О днях минувших и немного о сегодняшних» в *Театр. Эстрада. Цирк*, ред. С. М. Макаров (Москва: URSS, 2006) (Robert Ye. Slavskij "About the past days and a little about the nowadays," in *Theatre. Variety. Circus*, ed. Sergej M. Makarov (Moscow: URSS, 2006), 170-191.) [In Russian].

¹⁷ Максимилиан Немчинский, "Мифы легендарного времени", (Maksimilian Nemchinskij, "Myths of the legendary time"), *Ruscircus.ru*, <http://www.ruscircus.ru/10383/>. Accessed on February 2, 2020. [In Russian].

¹⁸ See note 11.

¹⁹ An abbreviation for “Ukrains'kyj Derzhavnyj Tsyryk” [Ukrainian State Circus]. For information about its foundation see: “Накази Міністерства культури, що стосуються діяльності творчого об’єднання”, ЦДАМЛМУ (Центральний державний архів-музей літератури і мистецтва України). “Orders of the Ministry of Culture Regarding the Work of the Creative Association, January 20 – November 25, 1993,” *Central State Archive-Museum of Literature and Arts of Ukraine* [TsDAMLUMU, an abbreviation for “Tsentral'nyj Derzhavnyj Arhiv-Muzej Literatury i Mistectva Ukrainy”], Fund 1393, Description 1, File 1, Sheets 1-3). [In Ukrainian].

²⁰ “DTsKU” is an abbreviation for “Derzhavna Tsyrykova Kompanija Ukrainy”. Translation in the text is given as it is provided in the company’s webpage: <https://ukrcircus.com/en/>. Accessed on January 16, 2020.

²¹ Most artists with the artistic conveyor perform just one or several acts, and these acts are available for divertissement programs that are assembled by the Head Office. However, some artists can create a troupe which performs its own exclusive program; these artists participate in the artistic conveyor as a whole single team and the Head Office doesn’t consider them for the divertissement.

²² “КМАЕТсМ” is an abbreviation for “Kyjivs'ka Muncypal'na Akademija Estradnogo ta Tsyrykovojo Mystectv”. Translation in the text is given as it is provided in the Academy’s webpage: <https://kmaestm.edu.ua/en/>. Accessed on February 15, 2020.

²³ “Про затвердження пріоритетних напрямів діяльності Міністерства культури України щодо розвитку циркової справи в Україні. Наказ Мінкультури від 18.05.2017 № 436”, *Законодавство України*. “On Approval of Priority Directions of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine Activities on the Development of Circus Industry in Ukraine. Order of the Ministry of Culture, May 18, 2017 № 436”, *Zakonodavstvo Ukrainy*, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/rada/show/v0436734-17>. Accessed on February 4, 2020. [In Ukrainian].

²⁴ “Проблемы развития циркового искусства обсудили в Общественной палате”, *ФКП “Росгосцирк”*. “Circus art development issues discussed at the Public Chamber,” *FKP “Rosgostsirk”*, December 3, 2015, <http://www.circus.ru/press-service/reports-and-speeches/10874/>. Accessed on January 28, 2020. [In Russian].

²⁵ See, for example, “Звіт про фінансово-господарську діяльність за 1994 р.” ЦДАМЛМУ. “Report on financial & economic activities for 1994,” *TsDAMLUMU*, Fund 1393, Description 1, File 17, Sheets 13-14. [In Ukrainian & Russian].

²⁶ See reports on financial & economic activities of the DTsKU on its webpage: <https://ukrcircus.com/?view=statements>. Accessed on January 15, 2020. [In Ukrainian].

²⁷ “Комплексна програма розвитку національного циркового мистецтва в Україні на 1996-2000 р.”, ЦДАМЛМУ. “Comprehensive Program for the Development of National Circus Art in Ukraine for 1996-2000,” *TsDAMLUMU*, Fund 1393, Description 1, File 28, Sheet 6. [In Ukrainian].

²⁸ “Штатний розпис на 1999 р.”, ЦДАМЛМУ. “Staff List for 1999,” *TsDAMLUMU*, Fund 1393, Description 1, File 65. [In Ukrainian].

²⁹ Максим В. Стріха, Валентин В. Солодовник, Олександр О. Різник, “Аналіз проблем циркової справи в Україні та розробка пропозицій щодо її реформування”, *Туризм Гуцульщини*. Maksym V. Striha, Valentyn V. Solodovnyk, and Oleksandr O. Riznyk, “Analysis of the problems of circus industry in Ukraine and proposals for its reform,” *Turyzm Gucul'shhyyn* <http://tur.kosiv.info/tourism-and-culture/>. Accessed on February 2, 2020. [In Ukrainian].

³⁰ “The history of the company,” *the State Circus Company of Ukraine*, <http://ukrcircus.com/en/?view=home>. Accessed on February 15, 2020.

³¹ “Протоколи засідань оперативних нарад у президента творчого об’єднання”, ЦДАМЛМУ. “Protocols of Operative Meetings with the President of the Creative Association, May 27–December 30, 1996,” *TsDAMLUMU*, Fund 1393, Description 1, File 33. [In Ukrainian].

³² See note 23.

³³ Катерина Константинова, «Куди поїде цирк?», *Дзеркало тижня*. Kateryna Konstantynova, “Where is the circus going?,” *Dzerkalo tyzhnja*, no. 3, January 29 – February 5, 2016, <https://dt.ua/CULTURE/kudi-poyide-cirk-.html>. Accessed on February 11, 2020. [In Ukrainian].

³⁴ See, for example, "Цирк у цирку" *Прес-служба Рахункової палати*. "Circus in the Circus," *Press Office of The Accounting Chamber*, November 24, 2009, http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/control/main/uk/publish/printable_article/16722197 24.11.2009. Accessed February 23, 2020. [In Ukrainian]; also see: "Про ефективність використання Міністерством культури і туризму бюджетних коштів, передбачених на фінансову підтримку національних театрів, національних та державних художніх колективів, концертних і циркових організацій. Аналітичний звіт за 2007," *Державна аудиторська служба України*. "On the Efficiency of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism Usage of Budgetary Funds Allocated for Financial Support of National Theatres, National and State art teams, concert and circus organisations. Analytical Report for 2007," *The State Audit Service of Ukraine*, June 5, 2008, <http://www.dkrs.gov.ua/kru/uk/publish/article/48580;jsessionid=F3359DABD9591BAB86D63726E1080AD4?&size=n>. Accessed on January 28, 2020. [In Ukrainian]; also see note 27; see also Олег Кій, «Пропозиція щодо реформування галузі циркового мистецтва в Україні». Oleg Kij, "Proposal for Reforming the Circus Arts Industry in Ukraine," [personal blog], October 16, 2016, <https://www.kiy.ua/2016/10/16/пропозиція-щодо-реформування-галузі/>. Accessed on February 20, 2020. [In Ukrainian].

³⁵ Ольга Тихомирова, "Украина запрещает использование животных в цирке". Ol'ga Tihomirova, "Ukraine prohibits the use of animals in the circus," *DW*, January 30, 2020, <https://www.dw.com/ru/украина-запрещает-использование-животных-в-цирке/a-52202375>. Accessed on February 20, 2020. [In Russian].

³⁶ The ban on circus animals contributed to the bankruptcy of one of the oldest Western circuses, Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus. See Bryan Armen Graham, "Sanctuary of joy: performers and crowds bid farewell to Ringling Bros circus," *The Guardian*, May 22, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2017/may/22/ringling-bros-barnum-bailey-circus-final-show>. Accessed on February 20, 2020; Charles Passy, "Ringling Bros. Shutdown: The end of the circus industry?," *Wall Street Journal*, January 16, 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ringling-bros-shutdown-the-end-of-the-circus-industry-1484530116>. Accessed on March 1, 2019.

³⁷ See Виктор Мельников, "Зоозащитники или зоошизы? Что ждет цирки Украины без животных", *Украина.ру*. Viktor Mel'nikov, "Zoo-defenders or zoo-crazy? What awaits the circuses of Ukraine without animals," *Ukraina.ru*, October 20, 2019, <https://ukraina.ru/exclusive/20191020/1025334147.html>. Accessed on February 20, 2020. [In Russian].

³⁸ "Річний баланс за 1987 р." *ЦДАМЛМУ*, ("1987 Annual Balance Sheet," *TsDAMLUMU*), Fund 514, Description 1, Continuation 2, File 629a, Sheet 12. [In Ukrainian].

³⁹ See note 23.

⁴⁰ Miriam Neirick, *When pigs could fly*, 10.

⁴¹ Иосиф М. Черненко, "Еще раз от автора" в Иосиф М. Черненко, *Здравствуй, цирк!* Iosif M. Chernenko, "Once again from the author," in Iosif M. Chernenko, *Hello Circus!* (Moscow: Molodaja gvardija, 1968). Retrieved from: <http://istoriya-cirka.ru/books/item/f00/s00/z0000008/st016.shtml>. Accessed on February 12, 2020. [In Russian].

⁴² Miriam Neirick, *When pigs could fly*, 11.

⁴³ For example, in 1961 the population of the USSR was 216.2 million, including Ukraine's 43 million. For more details see "Территория и население СССР", *Исторические материалы*, ("Territory and Population of the USSR," *Istoricheskie materialy*) <http://istmat.info/node/207>. Accessed on February 12, 2020. [In Russian].

⁴⁴ "Rostsirk" is an abbreviation for "Rossijskij tsirk" [Russian Circus].

⁴⁵ "Звіт про фінансово-господарську діяльність за 1993," *ЦДАМЛМУ*. "Report on financial & economic activities for 1993," *TsDAMLUMU*, Fund 1393, Description 1, File 8, Sheet 177. [In Ukrainian].

⁴⁶ "Листування з Міністерством культури України, посольствами зарубіжних країн, цирками з організаційно-творчих питань," *ЦДАМЛМУ*. "Correspondence with the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, embassies of foreign countries, circuses on organisational and creative issues, June 11 – October 29, 1993," *TsDAMLUMU*, Fund 1393, Description 1, File 6, Sheet 11. [In Ukrainian].

⁴⁷ Matthew Wittmann, *Circus and the City: New York, 1793-2010* (New York: Bard Graduate Center, 2012), 54.

⁴⁸ Robert Sugarman, "Russian circus," 193.

- ⁴⁹ Robert Hough, "The final confession of Mabel Stark," in *Step right up: Stories of carnivals, sideshows and the circus*, ed. N. Knaebel (New York: Carrol and Graf Publishers, 2004), 288.
- ⁵⁰ Евгений М. Кузнецов, "Модернизация цирка в России" в Евгений М. Кузнецов, *Цирк...* Yevgenij M. Kuznetsov "Modernisation of the Circus in Russia," in Yevgenij M. Kuznetsov, *Circus*, <http://www.ruscircus.ru/glav21>. Accessed on February 12, 2020. [In Russian].
- ⁵¹ See note 13.
- ⁵² See note 16.
- ⁵³ "Статут Українського державного творчого об'єднання цирків «Укрдержцирк», ЦДАМЛМУ. "Charter of the Ukrainian State Creative Association of Circuses 'Ukrderzhztsirk', March 16, 1993," *TsDAMLUMU*, Fund 1393, Description 1, File 2, Sheets 1-2. [In Ukrainian].
- ⁵⁴ Борис Бялик, "Послесловие и иллюстрации" в Евгений М. Кузнецов *Цирк...* Boris Bjalik, "Afterwords and Illustrations" in Ye. M. Kuznetsov, *Circus*, <http://www.ruscircus.ru/posleslov>. Accessed on February 12, 2020. [In Russian].
- ⁵⁵ Robert Sugarman, "Russian circus," 191-192.
- ⁵⁶ See, note 19 ("Orders," Sheets 11-12); also see note 29.
- ⁵⁷ "Документи наради представників циркових колективів (протокол, пропозиції, довідка, листування)", ЦДАМЛМУ. "Documents of the Meeting of Circus Teams Representatives (Protocol, Proposals, Information, Correspondence), October 29-30, 1993," *TsDAMLUMU*, Fund 1393, Description 1, File 4, Sheets 18-20. [In Ukrainian].
- ⁵⁸ Дмитрий Альперов, *На арене старого цирка. Записки клоуна*, ред. В. Е. Беклемишева. Dmitrij Al'perov, *In the Arena of the Old Circus. Clown's Notes*, ed. V. Ye. Beklemisheva, (Moscow: Hudozhestvennaja literatura, 1936), 93. [In Russian].
- ⁵⁹ Robert Sugarman, "Russian circus," 193-195.
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⁷¹ "Наказ Міністерства культури і мистецтв України № 512 "Про Творче об'єднання 'Державна циркова компанія України'", *ЦДАМЛМУ*. "Orders of the Ministry of Culture and Arts No. 512 'About the Creative Association The State Circus Company of Ukraine,' October 22, 1997," *TsDAMLMU*, Fund 1393, Description 1, File 37. [In Ukrainian].

⁷² See "Протоколи №№ 1-5 засідань художньо-експертної ради," *ЦДАМЛМУ*. "Protocols no. 1-5 of Art-expert Council Meetings, March 18 – December 12, 1996," *TsDAMLMU*, Fund 1393, Description 1, File 32; "Протоколи №№ 8-10 засідань Ради директорів циркових підприємств і організацій," *ЦДАМЛМУ*. "Protocols no. 8-10 of the Board of Directors of Circus Enterprises and Organizations Meetings, May 12 – November 1, 1997," *TsDAMLMU*, Fund 1393, Description 1, File 39, Sheet 13. [All in Ukrainian].

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⁷⁸ "Протокол № 1 наради керівників циркових підприємств та організацій," *ЦДАМЛМУ*. "Protocol no. 1 of the Heads of Circus Enterprises and Organisations Meeting, November 1-2, 1995," *TsDAMLMU*, Fund 1393, Description 1, File 20, Sheet 6. [In Ukrainian].

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⁸⁰ See note 34, "Circus in the Circus."

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⁸³ Tracy Y. Zhang, "The Chinese," 218.